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ABSTRACT
The history of the military police in Rio de Janeiro is a history of violence. Police violence
peaked during the democratic era when they have killed more civilians annually than the
total disappeared during the military dictatorship. Their violence unduly targets the urban
poor, those living in favelas, where poverty intersects with informality, where insecurity
manifests in unprotected spaces, from inadequate infrastructure to lack of land title; from
stigmatization as territories of criminality to violence as drug traffickers and militias battle
each other, and the military police, for control. The pacification police are an attempt to
reverse this history. The pacification police are the most prolific and contentious public
security policy in Rio de Janeiro's recent history. Their official objective is to restore
security to spaces once governed by armed criminals. But while pacifying the informal
settlements they are also pacifying the military police. As the state on the streets, or its
most visible aspect in the informal settlements, they are the locus of community concerns
and interlocutors with public authorities. The pacification police are altering perceptions of
the police in the eyes of residents and reforming what it means to be a law enforcement
officer in the minds of police. They are unintentionally connecting a state that was distant
from the informal settlements and complicit in the violence inside them to the urban poor.
The pacification police are beginning to transform urban governance across Rio de Janeiro.
Thesis Supervisor: Diane E. Davis
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INTRODUCTION
introducing the Pacification Police
The history of the military police1 in Rio de Janeiro is a history of violence
(Van Reenen 2004, 38). From their founding almost 200 hundred years ago until the
present day, policing has meant violence, primarily directed at the poor. Their
militarization during the military dictatorship did not initiate their repression. In
fact, police violence peaked after the transition to democracy, when armed criminals
dominated the informal settlements, and the military police countered in militarized
operations with masked faces and weapons of war. In recent years, they have killed,
on average more than 1,000 people annually - totaling almost 10,000 deaths since
2003, equivalent to a homicide rate of 40 per 100,000 inhabitants, or one dead for
every 23 they arrest (Instituto de Seguranga Pdblica; Human Rights Watch 2009).
The residents of the informal settlements where this violence is most concentrated
told me that the military police made no distinction between them and the bandits,
"The police only entered the community to kill...we were caught in the crossfire."2
Brazil is renowned for its stunning levels of violence. But with the eyes of the
world on Rio de Janeiro with its economic resurgence, the discovery of offshore oil
reserves and the mega-events of the Rio+20 Summit, the World Cup and the
Olympics, there are myriad reasons to bring violence under control. The pacification
police3 (Unidades de Policia Pacificadora, UPP) are the most prominent public
security policy in Rio de Janeiro in recent years. They operate in the most strategic
(or symbolically important) informal settlements, most in the prosperous southern
zone and on the road towards the Maracani Stadium where the World Cup final will
1 Brazil preserves a distinction between the civil and military police. The former are responsible for
criminal investigations; the latter with patrolling the streets. The military police are not part of the
military, though they were subsumed under the military during their dictatorship from 1964 to 1985.
2 Discussion with residents of Prazeres on May 31, 2011
3 The UPP have been translated as pacification police, pacifying police, peace-making police, among
others. The difficulty in translating the Portuguese word pacificapdo, literally pacification, to English
is its strong connotations of militarized repression. I will not disentangle its meaning here, though I
argue that these metaphors of war are reflective of the militarized history of the military police.
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be played in 2014. While they are criticized for this fact, this is where they have the
most visible impact and from where they could potentially percolate to the more
than 1,000 informal settlements throughout the city, most beyond the gaze of the
media, even the attention of the public authorities.
The very word pacification connotes both war and peace; war in the sense of
repression, peace by means of submission. Through their occupation of spaces once
governed by armed criminals, the pacification police aspire to bring peace through
metaphors of war. The question is whether they can do so where the police are seen
as one of the main actors of violence. Their first objective is territorial control, not
ending the drug trade, rather removing its obvious signs from the streets where
drug traffickers 4 once operated with impunity. After the elite squad of the military
police, sometimes in conjunction with the military, occupies an informal settlement
and displaces the traffickers, the pacification police operate on the basis of
community policing, furthering their second objective of fostering peaceful
connections between the residents of the informal settlements and the police.
The pacification police are portrayed as dominating the informal settlements
and praised for integrating these long marginalized areas with the city. The reality is
more complicated and in between, making it difficult to disentangle where public
security ends and urban development begins in unprotected spaces such as informal
settlements. The hillside slums of Rio de Janeiro are the iconic images of pervasive
inequality (Leeds 1996, 58). State presence inside the informal settlements has long
been selective, leaving them unprotected, their physical structures conducive to
clandestine activity, making them ideal bases for entrepreneurs of violence - drug
traffickers and militias - to conduct illicit activities. Their most recurrent interaction
with the state has often been through militarized police incursions. Testimony from
the residents of the informal settlements reveals a pervasive sense of fear, "our daily
lives are ones of violence, physical violence, moral violence, violence in all senses"
4 Because there is only one UPP in a formerly militia-controlled area (Batam), my analysis focuses on the drug
traffickers, though militias composed of off-duty security officials, including the military police, control about
one-half of all the informal settlements in Rio de Janeiro (Centro de Justiga Global 2008).
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(Machado da Silva 2008, 555). Similar words were echoed by many residents with
whom I spoke.
Though institutionally tied to the military police, the pacification police are
philosophically distinct. Their commander is a military police colonel; their officers
are drawn from ranks of the military police; but their recruits are all new and they
are trained in the precepts of community policing. The pacification police also have
different uniforms than the military police, different pay scales and different ways of
policing the informal settlements. There were 4,000 pacification police (out of
40,000 military police) working in twenty-two pacification police units as of May
2012. They began in December 2008s when the military police occupied the
community of Santa Marta in the midst of friction between rival trafficking factions.
The State Secretary of Public Security decided that more permanent police presence
would be a better means of reducing violence than intermittent armed invasions. A
month later another permanent police unit was installed in Cidade de Deus, which
had already been occupied by the police for several months. It was only afterwards
that the pacification police became Rio de Janeiro's official public security policy for
the informal settlements. 6 In the words of the State Secretary of Public Security:
For decades our policy was to enter and leave the favelas, where there were three
criminal factions fighting among themselves and with the police. Over decades we
have trained a police to make war, not to provide services. Now instead of having
warriors we have service providers (0 Globo May 28, 2011).
Their official purpose is to return security to communities once controlled by
armed criminals, but the unintended consequences of the pacification police go far
beyond security. In fact, the outcomes in terms of security are the most studied but
least controversial. As shown in the graph below, urban violence in Rio de Janeiro
s The pacification police have support from across the political spectrum. The Governor and the
Mayor are from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrdtico
Brasileiro, PMDB), which has an alliance at the federal level with the Worker's Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores, PT). This permits the state military police to join forces with the municipality's urban
upgrading programs and the federal government's Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de
Aceleragdo do Crescimento, PAC)., making the pacification police a multi-layered, multi-dimensional
policy that recognizes the police as essential for enhancing security but far from the only component.
6 Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29, 2011
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has declined in the past decade; much more telling is the drop in police violence. In
its deadliest year on record, the military police killed 902 people in 2007; only five
years later there were 301 recorded police killings, high on a per capita basis but a
dramatic decline of two-thirds nonetheless (Instituto de Seguranga Pdlblica). Without
proving causality between the introduction of the pacification police in late 2008
and the reduction in police violence, the downward trend points to the possibility
that something is working. In the first half of 2011, there were no homicides in
eleven of thirteen communities where the pacification police were operating, and
there was only one homicide in each of the other two areas (0 Globo October 31,
2011). This is not to deny reports of increasing robbery and domestic violence in
communities where the traffickers once imposed harsh punishments for these
crimes, but the pacification police say that people are reporting these crimes more. 7
Nor does it deny the increase in violence on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro where the
traffickers have probably fled, but residents of these neighborhoods have called for
their own pacification police rather than ending the program.
Violence in the City of Rio de Janeiro
(data from Instituto de Seguranga Pdblica)
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7 Based on discussions at a community meeting in Escondidinho on May 17, 2011 and an interview
with a pacification police captain on May 26, 2011.
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But I am not interested in examining the security impacts of the pacification
police. Instead, my thesis uncovers the evolving interactions between the residents
of the informal settlements and the pacification police. The pacification police are
deeply contentious. The residents praise and denounce the pacification police. They
appreciate that armed traffickers no longer walk the streets but they are frustrated
that weapons remain in the hands of the police. There is also skepticism within the
pacification police, with some lamenting the lack of adrenaline that initially caused
them to join the police, and others frustrated by ongoing tensions with residents.
But the differences with the past are undeniable. In contrast to criticism that the
pacification police are merely makeup as Rio de Janeiro prepares to host the World
Cup and the Olympics, or speculation that violence has not declined but only moved
its address, there are small signs that relations between the residents and the police
are improving, or at least evolving. This is evident in community meetings bringing
together the residents and the police, interactions unimaginable when the military
police only entered these communities shooting, in search of traffickers, or looking
for bribes. I portray perceptions of the pacification police in all their complexities
because any other way would have taken one side or another when almost everyone
that I spoke with agreed that the pacification police are very complicated.
I was surprised to learn that the most divisive part of the pacification police
is their regulation over the bailefunk, the dances once held by the traffickers, whose
lyrics reflect the struggles of thefavelas and sometimes glorify the kingpins. The
pacification police initially banned the bailefunk, but as this was too controversial,
many now permit them until certain hours. Several residents compared this to an
imposed social dictatorship, where once the traffickers controlled the community
with their social order, now the pacification police impose their own. Yet the rules
around the bailefunk are changing, with some captains calling for the residents to
vote on the hours they want to hold the dances, and others publicizing the bailes for
a wider public as part of a broader strategy to integrate the informal settlements
with the rest of the city. In the midst of controversy over the baile-funk, the residents
and the police are confronting each other peacefully in ways unthinkable before.
There remains deep-seated wariness by the residents and deep-rooted militarism
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by the police, but the pacification police are beginning to transform how the
residents of the informal settlements and the police are interacting with each other.
Another surprise of the pacification police is the ways they are broadening
the mandate of what it means to be a policeman in the informal settlements. The
commander of the pacification police, Colonel Robson Rodrigues, said that he seeks
"mutual transformation, humanizing the police's relations with the residents and
humanizing the police themselves."8 This means inculcating a different mindset, the
idea "you can be a policemen by using dialogue instead of a gun."9 The pacification
police are less focused on fighting drug traffickers and more interested in building
relationships with the community, especially with the children. The police are their
soccer coaches, dance instructors and tutors. There is almost a universal fascination
among the children for the police, especially their uniforms, and often when I talked
with the captains, there were children playing with his hat. The pacification police
work with the children because they are less opposed to the police, and they hope to
translate this acceptance to the rest of their family.10
Many demands placed on the pacification police are beyond their mandate.
Residents come to the police about unfulfilled promises, such as the pothole that the
public works department said it was going to fix and never did, or the kindergarten
whose roof collapsed and was never repaired. The police pave the way for service
providers by enhancing security and making the informal settlements more visible
and their infrastructure needs more pressing. The pacification police in attempting
to resolve these demands are unintentionally reforming the military police. Several
captains told me that they want to inculcate community policing back to the military
police, especially as this has proven more effective in reducing violence than more
militarized methods. There are already steps underway to reform the training of the
military police, which the commander of the pacification police described to me as
the formation of a "warrior ethos".1 ' While they are meant to pacify communities
8 Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29,2011
9 Ibid
10 Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in Santa Teresa on July 1, 2011
11 Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29, 2011
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made violent by criminal actors, the pacification may also be a means of pacifying
the military police.
The metaphors of war inherent to the training of the military police and their
history in policing the informal settlements need to be untangled for security to be
more than which armed actor governs but actually allows residents to improve their
homes and enhance their livelihoods, of which physical security is an important pre-
condition, but far from sufficient The contribution of the pacification police is in
undoing the metaphors of war that have made the military police unaccountable to
those they are meant to be protecting. The question is whether the pacification
police will transform the military police or whether the traditional militarism of the
military police will contaminate the pacification police. Without denying that the
pacification police have been tinged by the legacy of the military police and by their
violent methods of policing the informal settlements, the hope is that they are not
only pacifying the informal settlements but also, and more importantly, pacifying
the military police.
The police have been termed the state on the streets (Hinton 2006); yet inside
the informal settlements their presence has long been adversarial, distancing these
unprotected spaces from the state despite their physical proximity in the city. The
police are rarely conceived as a fundamental part of urban governance; more often
than not they are tolerated, avoided and ignored. Yet the police perform one of the
most essential societal roles in the provision of public security. Instead of seeing the
police as a problem to be solved they are actually an aspect of governance that could
be enhanced, as "fundamentally, a police officer represents the most visible aspect
of the body politics and is that aspect most likely to intervene directly in the daily
lives of citizenry. If one considers the President to be the head of the political system
then the patrolman on the street must be considered the tail" (Van Maanen 1973, 1).
As its everyday security representatives on the streets, the pacification police are
connecting the state to its citizens.
My thesis explores how the pacification police are (possibly) transforming
the understanding and experience of urban governance in the informal settlements
where they are operating. Because the first pacification police unit was inaugurated
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in December 2008, there is relatively little published beyond the Brazilian media
where most of the focus is on security with very little on their broader possibilities
for urban governance (except Machado da Silva 2010). One of the most interesting
unintended consequences of the pacification police is their connecting the state and
the urban poor. The pacification police are potentially part of a transition from a
militarized force that saw security through the lens of war towards a method of
policing more suited for a democratic era. Focusing on providing the security
needed to urbanize and upgrade the informal settlements not only transforms the
military police but also tackles the root of insecurity inside these communities -
their poverty and inequality that have marginalized them from the rest of the city.
It is not that the military police will overnight be transformed from actors of
violence into perfect community policemen. Instead, two words that often arose in
my interviews were learning and prevention. The pacification police are a learning
process, where they are learning by doing, developing successes and fixing mistakes.
They are also an effort at community policing where the focus is crime prevention
rather than only dealing with the consequences of crime. They are part of a reform
process. It is too soon to make definitive conclusions, as the pacification police have
only been operating for about four years, and some units for only a few months, but
there are changes already underway. They are altering perceptions of the police in
the eyes of the residents and reforming what it means to be an officer in the minds
of the police. The result is possibly a transformation in urban governance, where
with the pacification police as its security agents on the streets, the state is more
present, more responsive and more legitimate inside the informal settlements.
Reflections on Methodology
The stories told and conclusions made in my thesis are based on four months
of research in eleven pacification police units. I was in Rio de Janeiro from May to
July 2011 and from December 2011 to January 2012. My main methodologies were
participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Most of my interactions
with residents were informal, the result of listening to their accounts at community
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meetings and having spontaneous discussions on the side. Poverty and violence
have long marginalized these areas where access is difficult and where there is a
very definite line between those who are from inside the community and those who
come from the outside. Although the permanent presence of the pacification police
has enhanced security conditions, the history of territorial control by the traffickers
as well as memories of police violence made it difficult to talk to residents directly
about the pacification police; instead, most wanted to talk about the deficits of basic
infrastructure and lack of social services. It was by hinting at the pacification police
through these more pressing concerns that I understood that most residents do not
see security solely as those who control their community, whether the traffickers in
the past or the police in the present. Their understanding is broader. They hope that
the pacification police will provide the security needed for more important
investments in urbanizing and upgrading their communities.
There were also security reasons for why the residents are reluctant to talk
about the pacification police. The pacification police are far from the first experience
with community policing in several of communities. Past programs faltered due to
police corruption as well as their failure to gain political traction and support within
the military police. Many residents doubt the sustainability of the pacification police,
fearing the traffickers' return and their retaliation against those who supported the
police. Others see the pacification police through the same eyes as before, so despite
their different name and distinct uniforms, the pacification police are identical to the
violent actors that repressed them in the past Yet, even those who were reluctant to
discuss the pacification police ended up speaking about them indirectly by
explaining why they did not want to talk.
My discussions with the pacification police were more direct, but because the
military police remain a hierarchical institution, it is difficult to determine whether
their responses represent their personal views or the official line. I often perceived a
distinction between the officers (each unit is commanded by a captain, the highest
ranking officer in the community) and the recruits (the lower-ranking policemen
and women). Even the commander of the pacification police admits that the recruits
receive insufficient training in community policing. While most recruits told me that
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they wanted closer interactions with the residents, some missed the confrontation
that inspired them to join the military police.
The military police are often reluctant to answer the questions of outsiders. I
was privileged to have direct access to the pacification police through my internship
with the municipality's urban development institute, the Instituto Pereira Passos. My
internship was with the UPP Social, which is responsible for coordinating the
communities' most important needs in terms of infrastructure and social services
and working with the public authorities and the pacification police to resolve these
unmet demands. Meeting the police on this basis, when I heard their perspective
first in my role as a collaborator rather than as a critical researcher, facilitated my
interviews later, as I had already established a rapport through my everyday visits,
which I hope established the trust for more honest answers to my questions. This is
not to deny that my connections to the pacification police could bias my research in
other ways, especially as I was seen talking to both residents and police during my
frequent visits to the communities, and there is ongoing distrust between them.
In the course of my fieldwork I interviewed ten officers in the pacification
police, and I spoke with many more recruits while they were patrolling the streets. I
also interviewed two community leaders, and I spoke with and listened to countless
residents at community meetings. I also interviewed outsiders working inside the
communities, from four bureaucrats in the city government to one academic who
studies insecurity to four non-governmental representatives who experience these
changes inside the informal settlements everyday. I maintain confidentiality for the
residents as well as the pacification police except for their first commander, Colonel
Robson Rodrigues. As all of the meetings I attended and the interviews I undertook
were in Portuguese, and all of the quotations are my own translations, I try to keep
as close to the literal meaning as possible without losing the meaning in English.
Thesis Structure
The following tells the relatively unexamined stories of the everyday
interactions between the residents of the informal settlements and the pacification
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police. Chapter One provides a background to urban governance inside the informal
settlements, weaving together the narrative of state absence from these unprotected
spaces with the recognition of state complicity with the violence within them.
Chapter Two uncovers the history of intermittent attempts at public security policy
and military police reform. Chapter Three traces the evolving interactions between
the residents and the pacification police, not only examining the ongoing distrust
but also uncovering the signs of transitions underway. Chapter Four emphasizes
the often-overlooked perspective of the police, focusing on whether the pacification
police are reforming the military police from within. In conclusion, Chapter Five
explains how the pacification police are transforming urban governance across Rio
de Janeiro.
16
CHAPTER 1: WHEN STATE ABSENCE BECOMES STATE COMPLICITY
This chapter has a twofold purpose. First, it summarizes the ideas of urban
violence in unprotected spaces such as informal settlements. Second, it provides a
brief background on urban governance in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Integrating
the literature with the history, it describes how, in the absence of the state, non-
state armed actors came to govern significant parts of the city, and how, through the
complicity of the state, violence was perpetuated inside them. If the pacification
police are to make the state more physically present, more responsive and more
legitimate in the informal settlements, then it must first be shown how the state's
presence has long been selective, the public authorities unaccountable and the
military police illegitimate in the eyes of the residents. The chapter reveals how the
history of state neglect made the violence of the traffickers so powerful and how the
violence of the police came to define these communities' relationship with the state.
There are two explanations of violence in the informal settlements of Rio de
Janeiro. Both focus on the role of the state in catalyzing and intensifying violence.
The first asserts that the state has long been physically and symbolically absent (at
least distant) from the informal settlements where violence has been concentrated.
State absence made these spaces unprotected and permitted non-state armed actors
to establish social order. In the words of a Brazilian public security expert:
The bandits' territorial control subtracts the zones of urban poverty from the state
and creates an archipelago of independent areas, a form of clandestine feudal
barony, nonetheless visible, that the rule of law cannot reach, where democratic
institutions, the constitution, and the law do not operate (Soares 2000, 269).
The second claims the state has been present in ways that deepen violence.
Where once donos do moro (local leaders) established social order in the informal
settlements, they were displaced by drug traffickers who meted out their own order
through violence and reinforced their control by paying off the military police. The
police reinforced the traffickers' territorial control by corruption as well as violence
when illicit dealings turned sour. The state was complicit in perpetuating violence,
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with the urban informal poor caught between the illegal violence of the traffickers
and the official violence of the state. In the words of a Brazilian anthropologist:
The legal state has been absolutely disastrous, because (it functions) like an actor in
the conflict with bandits, using the same weapons and ethics as the bandits, who are
considered enemies. It engages in combat with them and, as a result, is transformed
into an equal of the bandits (Kant de Lima as quoted in Arias 2006a, 3-4).
The presence of the military police inside the informal settlements is one of
insecurity. As a resident once commented, "We're between a rock and a hard place.
It ends up being a perverse reversal, whereby the absence of the state (in the form
of the police) becomes beneficial" (Leeds 1996, 72). This suggests the paradox of the
police - in outbreaks of violence one of the state's first actions is to deploy the police
in the name of restoring order. The problem is that the police are complicit in much
of the violence but integral to public security. The history of police violence in the
informal settlements underlines the importance of demilitarizing the military police
to provide security rather than perpetuate insecurity.
The State Inside the Informal Settlements
The official objective of the pacification police is to restore security in areas
once controlled by armed criminals. But against the backdrop of violence, where
drug traffickers and militias battle each other, and the police, for territorial control,
where non-state armed actors destabilize the state's monopolization of the means of
violence, and where the state perpetuates violence through the police as its armed
security representatives, what is meant by security, and security for whom? Security
and the ability to create it have long been viewed under the purview of the state.
From Hobbes, who identified the provision of security as a basic function of the
state; to Weber, who believed that secure state formation necessitated control over
the means of coercion; to Tilly, who linked state formation with war making and the
provision of protection, security has long been defined in terms of state formation,
inter-state relations and political power (Goldstein 2010). Yet it has been difficult to
apply the ideas behind state security to more recent contexts of urban insecurity.
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Informal settlements are spaces where the distinctions between alternative
social orders are blurred but the consequences of competing forms of governance
are sharpened. The emergence of different orders in response to social inequities is
documented from Sicilian mafias to North American gangs to guerrilla movements
in the highlands of Peru to paramilitaries controlling city blocks in Medellin to drug
traffickers dominating thefavelas of Rio de Janeiro (Leeds 1996, 68-70). Armed
criminality flourishes where inaccessibility and administrative inefficiency are the
norm, but it has been said that banditry, gang rivalry, policing and war making are
on the same continuum towards state making, with the government an organized
protection racket against competing social orders (Tilly 1985, 170). What from the
outside are seen as ungoverned spaces are actually places where the state competes
with non-state armed actors to assert its authority. This is the case of many informal
settlements where violence converges in spaces where intermittent state presence
contributes to the rise of entrepreneurs of violence that profit from illicit activities,
such as the drug trade or the control over informal economies (Davis 2009, 222).
Violence is not specific to informal areas but this is where it is most concentrated
because these are unprotected spaces where the state's presence has been distant,
forcing residents to turn to illicit actors to provide security. They are also
unprotected from the violence of the state, most notably the police as its armed
security representatives.
The literature tends to set informal spaces distinctly apart from the formal
state, which is described as an outside force acting upon the community but almost
never acted on by the community. The state is seen as distant from the urban
informal poor who self-built their homes out of the material that was available,
starting with cardboard and wood, and scaling up to bricks and concrete; the
residents persevered for years under the constant threat of removal because they
lacked title to their land, a fact that ensured they received no electricity, no water
and sanitation and their access to education and healthcare was precarious at best,
as the provision of urban services would have been tantamount to legalizing their
illegality. But with the state depicted so abstractly, as a separate single entity set
apart from the community, it is difficult to understand the many ways that the
19
public authorities influence, impose and interact with these communities. The state
is not only a despotic actor that threatens the informal settlements with physical
removal but also an infrastructural power with the capacity to penetrate civil
society and enhance the conditions of its citizenry (Mann 1986, 114). Since Brazil's
transition to democracy, when political competition provided incentives to increase
the state's infrastructural presence in the informal settlements, there have been
investments in urbanizing them. One was Favela-Bairro, the continent's largest
urban upgrading project, that aimed to convert the slums (favelas) into
neighborhoods (bairros) by extending electricity and water services, installing
drainage and sanitation systems, paving alleyways and building public schools and
health posts (IADB 1994). Yet the one service never provided was security. In sum,
the state was not absent from the informal settlements, only present in different
ways, generating distrust among the residents and compounding their distance
from the state.
State Absence
With security seen as state control over the means of coercion, insecurity in
the informal settlements builds on assumptions about the weakness of the Brazilian
state. It has been argued that the insecurity prevailing throughout Latin American
cities stems from the failure of public institutions. This fragility particularly afflicts
impoverished informal areas resulting in the brown areas of democracy, where the
presence of the state is very low or even absent, and where private powers
reproduce authoritarian practices, resulting in a paradoxical disjunction where:
In many brown areas democratic, participatory rights are respected. But the liberal
component of democracy is systematically violated. A situation in which one can
vote freely and have one's vote counted fairly but cannot expect proper treatment
from the police or the courts puts into serious question the liberal component of
democracy and severely curtails citizenship" (O'Donnell 1993, 1361).
This matches the impasse of Brazilian informal settlements, where with political
liberalization they fear less their forcible removal by the state (though displacement
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by market forces remains a fear), but with economic uncertainty they suffer ongoing
inequalities in access to essential services, including public security. Citizenship is
further diminished in brown areas governed by non-state armed actors, such as the
drug traffickers and militias that control most of the informal settlements of Rio de
Janeiro. Their territorial control subtracted the zones of urban informality from the
purview of the state, with the informal settlements as the brown areas of Brazilian
democracy, or unprotected spaces outside the governance of the state, or governed
by non-state armed actors, intricately tied to the urbanization in Rio de Janeiro.
Before the rise of the drug traffickers, before even the violence of the police,
the poverty of the informal settlements defined the basis of their insecurity. The
first informal settlement (termed afavela after a local coarse and untamed plant)
was constructed at the end of the 19t century on the Morro da Providencia in
central Rio de Janeiro (Meade 1997, 71). Thefavelas became synonymous with the
self-constructed shacks climbing the hillsides, first in the central and southern
zones, soon spreading along the transport corridors towards the northern and
western peripheries. They materialized as the poor's only option for housing in the
midst of rapid urbanization. Unable to find affordable land in the city, the poor
innovated. They built their homes steep on the hillsides or far into the periphery,
investing in upgrading on an artisanal scale, creating a distinct urban landscape in
contrast to the planned streets and services of the formal city. Their houses are still
precariously and densely packed and access is complicated by few paved roads,
many narrow alleyways and broken stairs. Despite the struggle and success of
residents in urbanizing their communities, the favelas are still synonymous with
poverty, and in recent years with insecurity and violence.
Though physically intertwined with the formal city, the informal settlements
have been exceedingly remote from the public authorities' planning considerations.
They disrupted the carefully demarcated system of class privilege and undermined
the striven for sense of order. According to early 20b century police reports, they
were an "evil threatening the security of the entire community" (Pino 1996, 419).
Mayor Pereira Passos' urban renovation and beautification plan marked the first
favelas for removal around 1906. Thefavelas needed to be contained to ensure that
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their pathologies (and poor residents) did not spill into the rest of the city (Meade
1997, 94). Defining afavela as a "disordered nuclei of impoverished persons", the
public authorities counted 105favelas housing 138,837 people living in 34,538
shacks in 1948 (Pino 1996, 431). The number offavelas multiplied in the midst of
accelerating industrialization and urban migration during the 1950s to the 1970s.
The public authorities took a long time before formally acknowledging the
informal settlements. The 1950 census, the first to incorporate the more than 100
favelas into the public records, defined them by what they lacked: (i) minimum
proportions (more than fifty residences); (ii) type of habitation (predominance of
rustic shacks); (iii) juridical condition (without title to the land); (iv) public services
(absence of water and sanitation plumbing, electricity and telephone); and (v)
urbanization (lack of paved streets), under the assumption that they would cease to
tarnish the urban landscape if only they had more and better of everything (Pino
1996, 421). They persisted as aberrations on the modern city, with the government
refusing to mark them on maps (where until the 1980s they were blank spaces12 )
and eradicating them. About 100,000 residents from 70favelas were forcibly
resettled to periphery in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the most repressive
years of Brazil's military dictatorship (Arias 2006a, 25).
State policies towards the informal settlements were revised following the
transition to democracy in 1985.13 When the Inter-American Development Bank
prepared Favela-Bairro in Rio de Janeiro during the early 1990s, they estimated that
65 percent offavela households were not connected to potable water, 75 percent
were without adequate sanitation services and 67 percent had no garbage
collection. Street paving and drainage networks were inadequate or non-existent.
Almost 90 percent of families did not hold formal title to their land (IADB 1994).
They have since benefited from public investment, with services such as piped
water and electricity extended to almost all but the most peripheral communities.
12 Ricardo Henriques, President of the Instituto Pereira Passos, in Escondidinho on May 19,2011
13 The legal frameworks of the new urban order were enshrined in the 1988 Constitution and 2001
City Statute. The Constitution recognized the social right to housing and the right to regularization of
consolidated informal settlements. The City Statute outlined the legal instruments to realize these
goals and paved the way for urban upgrading programs throughout Brazil (Fernandes 2007).
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But despite decades of physical removal and in-situ upgrading, thefavelas remain
marginalized on multiple levels - by their inadequate infrastructure and scarce
social services; by their lack of legal land title; by their stigmatization as territories
of criminality; and by their violence as drug traffickers battle each other, and the
police, for territorial control. There are now more than one thousandfavelas where
some one and half million people reside in metropolitan Rio de Janeiro.
Population Living Rio de Janeiro Favelas (IBGE data
Decade City % Growth Favela % Growth % Favelaf Total
Population Total City Population Favelas
1950 2.4 million - 170,000 - 7%
1960 3.2 million 38% 335,000 98% 10%
1970 4.3 million 30% 565,000 69% 13%
1980 5.1 million 20% 722,000 28% 14%
1990 5.5 million 8% 883,000 22% 16%
2000 5.9 million 7% 1.1 million 24% 19%
2010 6.3 million 8% 1.4 million 27% 22%
Physically intermingled with the city, though existing almost apart on steep
hillsides or far into the periphery, the informal settlements are enclaves of poverty
with little public infrastructure or political representation. In the past, donos do
morro (local strongmen) controlled these communities by lending services in times
of suffering and protecting residents against threats of removal. They prohibited
crimes such as robbery, rape and murder and accused criminals were tried before
the dono who enacted extra-judicial punishments. They upheld their social order by
violently enforcing their authority (Dowdney 2003, 45). They were also tied to local
politicians in clientalistic agreements where the donos would guarantee political
support in exchange for public investment in their community (Arias 2006b, 298).
The emergence of the drug trade altered these intersecting patterns of state
absence and clientalistic control. There are three prominent drug trafficking factions
in Rio de Janeiro - the Comando Vermelho (Red Command), the Terceiro Comando
(Third Command) and the Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends). The roots of the
oldest, the Comando Vermelho, go back to the prison system during the dictatorship.
Political prisoners were incarcerated with common criminals, with the former
passing their organizational structure and collective ideology onto the latter. What
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was imparted was diffuse and enduring - the criminals saw what could be achieved
if they united in mutual assistance and forged a common identity around a set of
rules to which all were beholden (Leeds 1996, 54). The Comando Vermelho took
these rules with them when they returned to the favelas where many were from.
With the rise of the international cocaine market during the 1980s, they moved into
drugs in a more systematic fashion and soon they controlled the trade in most of the
informal settlements (Penglase 2008, 125-129).
The informal settlements, with their precarious hillside locations, densely
haphazard layouts, labyrinthine streets separating them from the city below, were
spaces where state presence had long been tenuous. They became the boca defumo
(mouth of smoke) for the cocaine trade. Their inaccessible geography, on
unmapped, unpatrolled hillsides, made them ideal bases for drug traffickers who
could defend themselves against rivals and elude police capture. In these virtually
impenetrable spaces, the traffickers replaced the lei do morro (law of the hill) with
the lei do trdfico (law of the traffickers). Their territorial control permitted them to
displace weak (or virtually non-existent) state institutions, divide hillsides among
factions, embed themselves to protect their business in return for internal security
and often a range of services, such as arbitrating disputes and providing social
assistance. In return for maintaining order and providing minimal social support,
they demanded a base from which to run their business and a vow of silence against
the police. As a resident recalled, "Your head was to think, your ears were to listen,
but your mouth was not to talk."14
Their authority was based on violence, but in return the traffickers offered
protection. According to one of the founders of the Comando Vermelho:
Organized crime occupies the space that the system, the government, ignores in the
area of social assistance. It's the bosses of the drug trade who buy school supplies
for the children offavela residents, who pay for medicine and even forfunerals.
When a poor person needs a larger favor, he sends a message to a comrade in
prison. From there come the orders to fulfill the request Even hospital beds are
arranged. Sometimes a woman in afavela doesn't have enough money to buy a
butane gas tank to cook for her kids. She goes to the boca defumo and the trafficker
14 Interview with a resident of Providencia from unpublished material prepared by SEASDH
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gives her gas. We gain a lot when we help people. That's why poor communities
protect drug traffickers. It's a question of survival (Penglase 2008, 131).
It was a system of reciprocity, uneven and coerced, where silence was earned both
in the small ways that they provided social assistance and by threats of force. Local
leaders who openly opposed this order were threatened, expelled, even murdered.
As a resident remembered, "the trafficker was our brother, our friend, our relative,
our enemy."15 This was echoed by a community leader who recalled, "the traffickers
became a parallel power, they were the power, they set the rules, but we were never
citizens for them. For the traffickers we were always subordinate."16 The residents
were forbidden to cooperate with the police, but because of police repression this
was what residents were unlikely to do. As one resident recounted, "Why do we
always talk about the police? Because we know that the traffickers are violent. They
are bandits on the edge of the law. What can we expect from them? We don't like the
traffickers, but we cannot trust the police."' 7
State Complicity
The interpretation of state complicity sees the state as very present in the
informal settlements, but in different ways than in the formal city. Police violence is
a case in point In their repression of the traffickers (or their collusion with them)
the military police gave them legitimacy by making the violence of the state almost
indistinguishable from that of the traffickers. The ideas that "the police are worse
than the bandits" and "it isn't that we like the bandits but we can't trust the police"
were voiced by many residents with whom I spoke. The history of the military
police reveals its complicity in perpetuating violence in the informal settlements.
The military police were founded almost 200 years ago in the capital of
newly independent Brazil, when more than half of Rio de Janeiro's population was
enslaved, and the military police were charged with restraining slave resistance and
reinforcing social separations (Holloway 1993, 39). It was thought that a militarized
15 Discussion with resident of Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on June 7, 2011
16 Interview with community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011
17 Interview with community leader in Prazeres on May 31, 2011
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police would be more disciplined in controlling an urban population perceived as
disorderly and dangerous (Caldeira 2000, 146). In the words of a military police
colonel, "The police are part of Brazil's colonial inheritance. They were constructed
apart from the population because if they were too close then this would threaten
the power of the state."' 8 Police violence has been documented from independence
to the present, from liberal to conservative governments, dictatorship to democracy,
the police found ways of legalizing repression and enacting extralegal activities
without punishment The repression of criminality targeted the working classes, as
"what the elite once called the social question has always been a matter of the police"
(Caldeira 2000, 139). The consequence is that the poor have continuously suffered
various forms of police violence and have learned to distrust the police. The modern
police continue to perpetuate these disparities by maintaining hierarchical relations
and enforcing security measures preserving these distinctions.
The military police are also a legacy of the military regime (1964 to 1985)
when they were institutionally subsumed under the armed forces in the name of
protecting internal security and repressing dissent The dictatorship suspended
constitutional guarantees of habeas corpus, canceled the mandates of congressional
representatives and mayors, purged leftist leaders and censored the press. Instead
of maintaining public security on the streets, the military police were charged with
upholding national security, broadening the repressive means at their disposal to
deal forcibly with the regime's opponents, both real and imagined (Hinton 2006,
94). Controlling unrest was the justification for repressing the civilian population of
all classes. There remain blurred distinctions between the military and the military
police, with the military police organized on military lines, trained in military
instruction and subject to military justice.
The military dictatorship sowed seeds of violence, not only by fusing criminal
elements with political opponents in inadvertently creating the Comando Vermelho
but also by reinforcing police violence in assigning a military role to a civilian police
18 Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29,2011
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force (Leeds 1996, 64). Nowhere is this truer than inside the informal settlements.
From its earliest days, the military police have been described as fighting a war, but:
Unlike warfare against an external enemy on the battlefield.. the objective was not
to exterminate or eliminate the adversary. The goal was repression and subjugation
and the maintenance of an acceptable level of order and calm, enabling the city to
function in the interests of the class that made the rules and created the police to
enforce them (Holloway 1993, 37).
To this day when the military police climb the hillsides of the informal settlements it
is most often with the mentality and tactics of an occupying army. They approach in
tanks known locally as caveirdo, or big skull, with rotating turrets turning 360
degrees and firing positions alongside the body. The flag of the elite squad of the
military police, which they raise at the top to symbolize the community's recapture
from the traffickers, depicts a skull impaled on a sword backed by two pistols - the
skull symbolizing death, the sword signifying combat weapons that when pointed
downwards through the skull indicate war, the black background meaning
mourning and the pistols the insignia of the military police (Hinton 2009, 218).
Police violence is also fueled by corruption, with the police often entering the
informal settlements not to combat the drug trade but to share in its spoils. A former
chief of civil police went so far to say that, "nothing is trafficked in this city without
the collusion of the police" (Human Rights Watch 1996). Many operations are not to
capture (or kill) the traffickers, or undermine their territorial control, but to enact
revenge against factions that do not meet their extortion demands. In return for not
interfering in the drug trade, the police demand payoffs from the traffickers who in
turn budget the funds needed to pay off the police. This coexistence breaks down
when the police think that they do not receive their fair share. Since the traffickers'
leadership is diffuse and evolving, the police negotiate with multiple factions rather
than one organization, with the nature and price of these arrangements different
from one place to another. What the police are selling is protection, their bargaining
conducted by violence, or at least the threat of it, as they need to prove how much
their cooperation is worth by pressuring the traffickers (Penglase 2008, 136-137).
The standoff between the military police and the traffickers is unstable, conflictive
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and constantly subject to renegotiation, in vicious cycles of retaliation and counter-
retaliation deepening levels of violence.
It should be noted that the preponderance of police violence and corruption
is also a consequence of its poor training, poor equipment and poor salaries. The Rio
de Janeiro police are among the lowest paid in the country, which forces many to
supplement their incomes by working second jobs, often as private security guards,
or even paramilitary forces known as the militias (Hinton 2006, 113; Huggins 2000,
118). Moreover, their operations inside the informal settlements are also deadly for
the police. As a captain in the pacification police remembered, "we entered afavela
without knowing who lived there; we looked at everybody as though they could be
connected to the traffickers."19 The feeling of being targeted from rooftops and
behind staircases by traffickers as young as children created a sensation that led to
one immediate reaction, "shooting your weapons everywhere because you feel like
you are constantly under attack."20
Another aspect of state violence is vigilantism, often enacted by off-duty
security officials who take the security of their communities into their own hands.
These are the militias who have displaced the traffickers from most of the western
zone of Rio de Janeiro. But in violently enforcing their authority, they act much like
the traffickers they replace. The main difference is that they finance themselves by
monopolizing informal services, such as transport, cable television and cooking gas,
and charging protection fees to local businesses, rather than by selling drugs
(though they may be moving into this more lucrative business). But what are most
controversial about the militias are their alleged connections to local politicians, as
the state turned a blind eye to their emergence once the militias were combating the
traffickers (Centro de Justiga Global 2008,48).
It is difficult to disentangle where state absence ends and state complicity
begins inside the informal settlements. The traffickers consolidated their territorial
control over the informal settlements because this was where the state was distant.
Yet state absence could be interpreted as state complicity because politicians and
19 Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Southern Zone conducted on July 1, 2011
2 0 Ibid
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policemen are tied to the traffickers in clientalistic relationships (Arias 2006c).
Police corruption is understood as state complicity in deepening insecurity in the
informal settlements. Yet state complicity could also be interpreted as state absence
because if the police were more fully present inside the informal settlements, then
the traffickers and militias would exert less control over these spaces and violence
would no longer characterize their connections with the state. The absence of the
state from the informal settlements as well as its complicity with the violence within
them means that the urban poor have only been indirectly under the governance of
the city authorities throughout most of their history.
Inside these unprotected spaces the state reproduces violence, both overtly
through the military police as its armed security representatives and covertly with
its complicity in the violence of others. Entrepreneurs of violence seek material gain
rather than political control, but in controlling significant parts of the city they blur
distinctions between economic and political violence, even expose the fragility of
the national state. In their imposed social order on the informal settlements, the
traffickers and the militias have come to take on the functions of the state at a much
smaller scale by monopolizing the means of coercion and providing the community
with protection in exchange for control over territory. The lucrative sums of money
involved in the drug trade (and in extortion in the case of the militias) permit them
to challenge state control in significant portions of the city and infiltrate the state
agencies charged with coercion, namely the police, thus further limiting its capacity
to reduce violence. State responses to insecurity are complicated by the fact that
those charged with keeping order are also implicated in insecurity.
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CHAPTER 2: Policing the Informal Settlements
In addition to well-known accounts of military police violence, there are less-
examined narratives of police reform. Usually these efforts have been brushed aside
as failures, because they were small-scale, they were soon discontinued and they did
little to halt escalating police violence. But despite ongoing police violence there are
also undercurrents for reform from inside the state secretary for public security and
within the military police. Before discarding these past attempts at police reform as
failures there are often new lessons to be learned from old projects.
This chapter sets out to uncover the hidden successes in the midst of all the
pessimism about intractable police violence and impossible police reform. It builds
on Tendler's analysis of governance innovation in perennially corrupt northeastern
Brazil where she uncovers several surprising success stories. "Discovering these
banished histories is not difficult," she writes, "and is particularly important because
it will uncover important lessons of the story." This is especially so when analyzing a
current program as it "may represent significant improvements over its antecedents
- lessons that also need to be learned" (Tendler 1998, 3). There are many lessons
the pacification police are incorporating from the past that in turn are informing
their actions in the present. Instead of viewing these past programs as distinct from
the current one, it is important to distinguish small successes as well as lessons that
lie buried in a program's past.
This chapter traces the intermittent history of police reform in Rio de Janeiro.
Although portrayed as innovative, the pacification police are actually based on past
attempts at police reform. These past programs recognized police repression as
incompatible with providing public security, not to mention irreconcilable with the
democratic era. To demilitarize their approach to policing the informal settlements,
reform-minded police officers and public security officials turned to community
policing to prevent crime and reduce police violence. It is tempting to think of these
past programs as unsuccessful because of the deepening of police violence (at least
until very recently), but this overlooks new lessons that could be learned from old
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projects, including: (i) the perception of the police in the eyes of the community (to
gain their trust); (ii) the avoidance of territorial coexistence between the traffickers
and the police (to avoid corruption); and (iii) the need to move beyond charismatic
leadership to convince the military police as well as public security policymakers of
the efficacy of less repressive policing (to ensure sustainability). The actions and the
discourse of the pacification police are framed by lessons from the past, but to
become part of a broader transformation in how the state is present in the informal
settlements they need to break with the reoccurring failures that undermined past
programs of police reform.
Public Security Reform and Reversal
Of the many institutional transformations since the democratic transition,
the one institution that has not democratized is the security apparatus (Leeds 2007,
22). While legal norms have been overturned, norms of unaccountability have not,
with laws of exception issued to accommodate police oversteps or conceal them
from outside scrutiny and shifting legal boundaries framing police powers blurring
tenuous distinctions between the legal use of force and illegal repression (Caldeira
and Holston 1999,700).
In contrast, community policing builds partnerships between the police and
citizens and prevents crime by tackling its causes rather than only confronting its
consequences. Colonel Nazareth Cerqueira, the commander of the military police in
Rio de Janeiro from 1983 to 1987 and 1991 to 1994 (the first policeman rather than
army officer to hold this position) brought these ideas to Brazil. Contemplating the
role of the military police in the democratic era, he sought an alternative to police
repression because it was ineffective in reducing violence and incompatible with
democracy. Police reform meant transforming the military police not only within
the institution but also in the minds of citizens. Envisioning a different policing for a
more democratic Brazil, he wrote:
I did not doubt that the police guidelines and the democratic context demanded a
new policy, a new police and a new conception of public order that went beyond the
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previously adopted doctrine of national security. I was certain there was the need to
formulate a new Brazilian police, believing that the democratic moment was an
important opportunityfor such a venture (Cerqueira 2001, 19).
He finishes with remorse, "Oh, how I was wrong!" Public security policy under his
leadership and beyond followed a disjointed implementation, with the trend
towards deepening militarization, punctured only briefly by moments of reform.
Colonel Cerqueira brought the ideas of community policing2 ' to Brazil from
what he learned in North America. Community policing is a preventive approach to
security where society is the first defense against crime. It attempts to foster trust
with the police and address the origins of criminality. It is based on three pillars: (i)
community partnerships, to build collaboration with the police; (ii) problem solving,
to engage in proactive policing; and (iii) organizational transformation, to inculcate
these ideas within the police (Community Oriented Policing Services, United States
Department of Justice). Outwardly focused on reducing crime by preventing crime,
community policing also focuses on police reform. Reconstructing relationships
with communities to gain their trust, reorienting indicators away from statistics of
crime to measures of prevention and retraining officers to enhance their
connections with the community are all components of community policing.
Leonel Brizola, the first democratically elected Governor of Rio de Janeiro
(1983 to 1987 and 1991 to 1994) took immediate steps to dismantle the repressive
apparatus of the military dictatorship. Part of his platform was police reform. As his
appointed chief of military police, Colonel Cerqueira was determined to improve the
police's human rights record by humanizing its actions in the informal settlements:
Policing is not about confrontation but conflict resolution. The democratic era
demands a different definition of the police that no longer prioritizes combat as
part of a philosophy of war that has long marked police repression. It is necessary
to replace this mistaken idea of the police with one that prioritizes human rights. It
21 It is important to note that many initiatives termed community policing are not generated at the
community level, nor do they involve community participation. Instead, community-oriented policing
describes policing programs generated from above, but oriented toward concerns from below. This is
a useful distinction to make with the pacification police, which while not executed with community
consultation, certainly include community outreach (Arias and Ungar 2009, 409).
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is necessary to clarify that we are not soldiers and that there is no enemy to combat
but crime to prevent (Cerqueira 2001, 24).
Brizola's public security model was based on ending police impunity. He banned the
military police from undertaking blitzs, or roadblocks accompanied by on-the-spot
searches in the informal settlements. His order preventing the police from "kicking
down the doors of shacks" and "arresting and searching suspicious people without
judicial authorization" was popular among residents, but panic spread everywhere
else it was said that restraints on the police tied their hands and stimulated the drug
trade. Those opposed to reforming the military police claimed that the traffickers
were exploiting the intense public discord to consolidate their territorial control
(Hinton 2006, 130).
Policing the informal settlements turned increasingly repressive. There was
little support for police reform when homicide rates in Rio de Janeiro rose from 23
per 100,000 people in the early 1980s to 74 per 100,000 people by the mid-1990s
(Instituto de Seguranga Pdblica). There was temporary (and illusionary) security
when the federal armed forces were called upon to patrol the streets and occupy the
informal settlements (as happened during the United Nations Earth Summit in 1992
and Operation Rio two years later), but this overlooked deep problems of police
violence. Two well-publicized cases from 1993 were the massacre of eight children
sleeping outside the Candeliria Church and 21 residents of Vigirio Geral, both by
police vigilantes (Leeds 1996, 65).
There were still glimmers of reform inside the military police but these were
momentary and shortly reversed. One was an experiment with community policing
in the wealthy neighborhood of Copacabana, which took place over a period of less
than one year from 1994 to 1995. The program brought together 60 recent
graduates of the military police academy. Their training went beyond patrolling the
community on foot to having the freedom to organize their routine based on
interacting with the residents. The objective of community policing was to come to
know the community's security concerns and become co-authors of their solutions
through prevention rather than repression. The police attempted to deepen their
33
knowledge by placing urns around the community where residents could write
down their security concerns. The police also attempted to foster partnerships with
the community through local security councils. In practice, the program operated
under difficult conditions. It was isolated within the military police and it failed to
gain traction with the community; only two security councils were held and very
few written comments were placed in the urns. Police indicators were based on
criminal apprehensions not crime prevention, thus community policing failed to
meet demands for immediate and spectacular results. After less than one year, the
project was discontinued, falling at the side of the increasingly hard-line public
security debate (Musumeci et. al. 1996).
Governor Alencar (1995 to 1998) reflected the reversal from police reform
towards repressing criminality. His State Secretary for Public Security underlined
the administration's policy when he said, "the police, not the criminal, needs to fire
the first shot and ask questions later" (Hinton 2006, 133). He reinstated the blitz
operations in the informal settlements and reintroduced an obscure policy from the
military dictatorship where the police received bravery promotions for the number
of criminals they confronted, even killed. An officer revealed where criminals were
found, "You have to make their life hell so they don't come down from the hills...I
didn't allow the bandit (marginal da lei) to leave the hills for the asphalt I corralled
him so that he could not go out" (Hinton 2006, 133). Although the police argued that
this was effective in more directly confronting the traffickers rather than permitting
them to hide in the hillsides, there was a six-fold increase in the number of civilians
killed by the military police during this time (Human Rights Watch 1997). Further
investigation into extrajudicial police brutality analyzed the facts contained (and
omitted) in police and coronel reports to prove, with a preponderance of evidence,
that the military police systematically employed unnecessary lethal force, destroyed
homicide scenes, archived cases of police on civilian violence, even those with
evidence of summary execution, and misreported executions as justifiable acts of
self-defense, those classified as auto de resistencia (Cano 1997).
The administration of Governor Garotinho (1999-2001) and his appointment
of Luiz Eduardo Soares to the State Secretary for Public Security was yet another
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turnaround. Soares simultaneously sought to increase the crime-fighting capabilities
of the police while inculcating a respect for human rights. Believing that changes in
public security began with changing the police, he wrote:
Extra-judicial combat sought to eliminate crime by executing offenders. The result
was disastrous and paradoxical: a police force involved in criminality and powerless
against its own crime. The military police are organized on principals of war. It
employs force based on blind obedience, speed in execution, vertical hierarchy and
lack of autonomy. With the exception of combat situations, the military police were
not designed for public security whose complex challenges require exactly the
opposite: flexible and decentralized decision-making, agility and adaptive oversight
Only then will it be possible to apply modern methods, such as policing oriented
towards the resolution of problems or community policing (Soares 2009).
Soares set out to raise the standards for the police through improved training and
salaries as well as increased collaboration with communities in tackling insecurity.
His reforms included refurbishing civil police stations from centers of intimidation
into places of professional interrogation, designating Integrated Public Security
Zones to incentivize collaboration between military police battalions and civil police
precincts, establishing Community Security Councils to raise citizens security
concerns and redesigning training programs, including one where officers enrolled
in university courses in history, politics, justice, citizenship and human rights. There
was a 40 percent reduction in the number of police killings in his first year on the
job, as well as a reduction in the number of police killed and a record number of
weapons seized (Hinton 2006, 136-142).
One significant change was the establishment of an ombudsman to receive
and monitor complaints about police abuses. Although unable to investigate these
charges, the ombudsman was part of a process of police reform. It received 1,586
complaints in its first nine months of operation in 1999, including accusations of
torture, extortion and excessive use of force; there were indictments in 20 percent
of cases; convictions handed down in 7 percent; no policeman was jailed or
expelled; and it was the ombudsman that turned into Soares' undoing (Caldeira and
Holston 1999, 707). The Governor fired Soares on live television after he accused
the police of intransience for not looking into the documented abuses (Hinton 2006,
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143). In its first ten years, the ombudsman recorded 7,800 complaints against the
police; yet of the only 42 criminal charges brought by state prosecutors only 4
resulted in convictions (Human Rights Watch 2009). The failure of the ombudsman
points to the distressing lack of accountability within the military police despite the
escalating statistics of police violence.
raperiments in Community Policing
Against the backdrop of police violence, there was also a consistent but small
group of reform-minded public security specialists and police officers committed to
reform. These individuals attempted several community policing initiatives in the
informal settlements that were under-resourced, undermined by policy reversals
and unsupported by many inside the military police, but because they foreshadow
the pacification police in their attempt to reform policing in the informal settlements
they offer important lessons.
Their hillside locations, narrow alleyways inhibiting vehicle access and high
density behind a maze of staircases complicate policing in the informal settlements.
The first attempts at patrolling the informal settlements began with posts known as
Ostensive Police Detachments (Destacamento do Policiamento Ostensivo). They only
existed in a small number of communities and most often they were composed of
four police. The outnumbered police stayed inside small armored booths separating
them from heavily armed traffickers. For their own protection they often ended up
colluding with the traffickers (Dowdney 2003, 66). Community Policing Posts (Posto
de Policiamento Com unitdrio) were meant to engage with the community by offering
social services, but again problems arose when the police avoided confrontation
with the traffickers most often by cooperating with them (Mattar et. al. 2010, 76).
Corruption meant that experiments in community policing were seen as failures; yet
there were also hints of isolated successes, most notably the decline in violence
when there was a more permanent police presence. These small-scale initiatives
laid the foundations for more far-reaching community policing programs.
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The Police Grouping in Special Areas (Grupamento de Policiamento em Areas
Especiais, GPAE) was an unprecedented community-policing program that sought to
restructure the policing of the informal settlements by building better relations with
the residents and permanently stationing the police inside the community. It began
in 2000 in the community of Cantagalo/Pavio-Paviozinho after residents took to
the streets to protest the killing of five of their neighbors whom the military police
accused of being traffickers. Under the leadership of Colonel Carballo, the number of
homicides was reduced to zero in its first two years (Arias and Ungar 2009, 418).
Carballo did not have the resources to remove the traffickers from the community;
rather he prohibited (i) the circulation of firearms; (ii) the involvement of children
in criminality; and (iii) the abuse of power by the police (Albernaz et. al. 2007, 42).
His objective was the reduction of violence, not the end of the drug trade.
Inside the informal settlements, the GPAE struggled to gain the confidence of
the residents, and within the military police he confronted skepticism of community
policing. Carballo promised to investigate accusations of police abuse. He personally
handed out pamphlets with his phone number so that residents could contact him at
anytime (Arias 2004, 23). The police also received requests for medical assistance
and employment; their stations were seen as places to complain about the problems
of public services; and the residents even called upon the police to provide physical
education and tutoring for the children (Albernaz et. al. 2007, 42). Yet there were
tensions over the bailefunk, which were never banned, but the GPAE imposed rules
on how late they could occur and how loud the music could play (Albernaz et. al.
2007, 43). There were also tensions within the police. Their patrols of the informal
settlements were more physically demanding than stationary posts in the city.
There was the feeling that reaching out to the residents did not constitute real police
work. Playing on the Portuguese word for mother (mde), the GPAE were scorned as
GMAE.22 The GPAE were given the most truculent officers as a purposeful strategy to
thwart its success, and in its first year 70 percent were transferred due to abuses
against the residents and corruption with the traffickers (Albernaz et. al. 2007, 43).
22 Interview with Silvia Ramos, the coordinator of the Center for Studies on Public Security and
Citizenship, at University Candido Mendes on July 11, 2011
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The GPAE's initial success in reducing violence was corrupted because the
police failed to territorially dislodge the traffickers. Police presence restricted their
movement, as the traffickers could no longer walk through the community armed,
but they carried out their trade almost unhindered on the other side of the hill. As a
resident recalled, "If the police were on one side of the hill, the bandits were on the
other. We didn't cross this divide. The effects were small, changes in command, but
the corruption was evident" 23 Restricting their patrols to areas around the station,
the police symbolically indicated which points were the 'territory of the police', thus
the other spaces were re-appropriated as 'territory of the traffickers'. An officer in
the pacification police currently working in Cantagalo/Pavio-Paviozinho recalled
how the police relinquished control to the traffickers:
In the beginning, the GPAE was like the UPP, but it lacked investment and
institutional support. The GPAE had no power, which meant that the area of the
police soon became the area of the traffickers, showing the community that the
police were powerless; they co-existed with the traffickers. The traffickers had an
arsenal of war and the police were hostages of the criminals.24
Police toleration of the drug trade meant that residents distrusted those meant to
provide security. They said the only difference between the time of the traffickers
and the time of the GPAE was the end of the shootings (Albernaz et. al. 2007, 44).
Lessons Learned in Community Policing
The parallels between the GPAE and the pacification police are striking.2s In
the community of Cantagalo-Pavio/Paviozinho, violence declined dramatically after
the GPAE was implemented only one decade before violence yet again plummeted
with the pacification police. This is a difficult legacy to overcome for the pacification
police currently stationed in the community. Everyday they must prove that they
will not be corrupted by the traffickers, nor will they leave the community as the
23 Interview with a resident of Cantagalo-Pavio/Paviozinho on July 12, 2011
24 Interview with an UPP officer in Cantagalo-Pavo/Pavsozinho on July 12,2011
25 Of the six communities where the GPAE once operated, the pacification police are now patrolling in
five: Cantagalo-Pavso/Pavsozinho, Formiga, Vila Cruzeiro (Complexo da Penha) and Casa Branca and
Characa do Ceu (Borel)
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GPAE did after only a few years. This is one of the reasons that the captain has built
a six-storey police station on the main road of the community. He is attempting to
project a perception of permanence in order to separate the pacification police from
the GPAE. Yet this is not to overlook the myriad differences between them, as noted
by a professor of public security in Rio de Janeiro:
The UPP is not an unprecedented experiment because Rio dejaneiro had similar
experiments in the past, like the GPAE, the community policing in Copacabana, but
this is the first time that the state is investing heavily in the program, and it is the
first time that the state says this is the model to follow. In the past, these
experiments were literally experiments, and the police thought that they were
strange things, not real policing, only something on the side, but now the idea is
that this will become normal policing in poor communities in thefuture. Whether
this will be so or not is still in the cards.26
If the metric of success is a sustained reduction in violence then experiments
with community policing failed. The more permanent and peaceful presence of the
police in the informal settlements was in actuality only intermittent and complicit
with the traffickers. Despite reduced violence in Cantagalo/Pavio-Paviozinho, this
photogenic community with its panoramic views is often the site of pilot projects
because what happens on the hillsides reverberates in the wealthy neighborhoods
below. There were significant problems with police corruption in Cantagalo/Pavio-
Paviozinho, thus expanding the GPAE to hundreds of other communities, most
beyond the gaze of the media and the interest of civil society, would have required a
level of political continuity and police commitment that, as this chapter has shown,
would have been difficult to attain. When controversies over police violence passed,
and the determination to reform the military police faded, the traffickers once again
regained their territorial foothold in the informal settlements.
One of the main lessons learned from past community policing projects was
that leadership was important, from policymakers at the top who sought broad
reforms to police officers who brought innovation on the ground. When there was
disruption, including a change in political administration, or a dismissal of a reform-
26 Ignacio Cano interviewed by RioRadar on August 29, 2011. Available at:
http: //rioradar.com/tag/ignacio-cano
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minded police officer, the tendency was for leadership to shift back to those that had
prevailed in the past, the hard-line policymakers who favored violent incursions, the
military police who saw themselves as soldiers and the traffickers who dominated
the informal settlements. Yet there are several other lessons from the history of
police reform in Rio de Janeiro: (i) the deep-seated mutual mistrusts, not only the
residents' suspicion of the police but also the wariness of the police towards reform;
(ii) the corruption of the police when they are in close proximity to the traffickers;
and (iii) the often disorienting lack commitment on the part of policymakers. It
seems that for police reform to succeed that there need to be alignments across the
political spectrum, an end to territorial coexistence between the police and the
traffickers and efforts to ameliorate distrust between residents and police. There
also need to be efforts to convince the military police of the efficacy of community
policing. When these obstacles were overcome - even momentarily - there was a
reduction in violence, and a step towards enhancing security in the informal
settlements. Reforming an institution such as the military police is not something
that lends itself to quick fixes. This is especially true in Rio de Janeiro where the
military police are one of the main actors of violence.
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CHAPTER 3: Evolving Perceptions of (In)security
The contradiction of police violence is that while the police are at the core of
the problem they are also integral to its resolution. The pacification police typify this
paradox. While charged with bringing security to the informal settlements, the
police are often the source of insecurity, at least in the eyes of the residents. The
pacification police are an attempt to redefine how security is experienced in the
informal settlements. This chapter summarizes my main impressions of the
pacification police based on the many community meetings I attended, discussions
with residents on the side of these meetings, interviews of police officers and
personal impressions from noticing how the residents and the police interacted
with (or avoided) each other.27
Perceptions of the pacification police are in a state of transition. None of the
residents called for the end of the pacification police, but many remain wary. They
appreciate the opportunities for their children, but they wonder about the
adolescents who are the most resistant to the police. They say that they can come
and go without the fear of violence breaking out between the traffickers and the
police, but they fear ongoing police repression from searching their homes and
belongings. Some compare the militarization of their community under the
pacification police to their domination by the traffickers:
Nobody liked the shootings, but we left the judgment of the traffickers for that of
the police. There are still heavy weapons; the only difference is that the gun is no
longer in the hands of the trafficker but the police. What kind of peace is this?28
The police are sensitive to their suspicions, as one policewoman told me:
It wasn't very long ago that the police were putting guns in people's faces and now
they are all about good morning, good afternoon. This transition will take time.29
27 My fieldwork covered 11 pacification police units (Andarai, Babil nia-Chap6u/Mangueira, Borel,
Cantagalo/Pavgo-Pavsozinho, Cidade de Deus, Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa, Prazeres-Escondidinho,
Providencia, Suo Carlos, Tabajaras/Cabritos and Turano
28 Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011
29 Discussion with a UPP recruit in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on July 1, 2011
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This chapter will reveal how this transition is already underway.
Changing Perceptions of the Police
Among the many residents with whom I spoke, there is very little debate that
security, at least defined by the reduction of violence, has improved following the
arrival of the pacification police. The following quotations illustrate a consensus on
the most positive aspects of the pacification police:
The end of the shootings, between rival traffickers or from police invasions,
means that there is a sense of calm and tranquility: "Today we no longerfear
police incursions because we are with a police that are doing their part day by day.
We are still in the process of adaptation, but there is no doubt that with the
pacification police we now have what we never had before, and that is peace."30
The end of the armed traffickers on the street means that the residents are no
longer as threatened by weapons: "With the arrival of the pacification police the
weapons lefL We can't say that the traffickers left, because there are still some
remnants, but the weapons left and they were our biggest fear."31
The end of the domination of the traffickers means that they hold less fascination
for the young people: "I know that my children will not grow up with the vision of
the traffickers, thinking that this is the fantasy life."3 2
The right to come and go with some level of security means that now the adults
can travel to work, and their children can attend school, without worrying that
violence will occur: "There used to be so much shooting here. Now we can all go
down and come back up the hill tranquilly."33
The beginning of a different type of police presence: "Now we know the police
working in our community. Before they would come, they would shoot, the
traffickers would shoot and the police would leave. Today we know their names, we
know who they are and they know who we are too."34
The expectations - still unrealized, yet hopefully in progress - that the increased
security would bring more investment in these impoverished communities where
30 Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27,2011
31 Discussion with a resident of Borel on June 17, 2011
32 Discussion with a resident of Prazeres on May 31, 2011
33 Discussion with a resident of Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 25, 2011
34 Discussion with a resident of Providencia on June 10, 2011
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infrastructure is often deficient and social services are almost absent: "The streets
have potholes; water only comes through the pipes once a week; sewage flows
through open canals that haven't been cleaned in years and they overflow every
time there is a strong rain. We want complete security, notjust the police invasion,
but also a social invasion."35
Outsiders working in the community agree that security is much improved.
According to a social outreach coordinator for an urban upgrading project, it was
difficult to work in the informal settlements previously controlled by the traffickers.
He remembered how much of his time was spent dealing with problems of violence.
The government's offices were built to withstand bullets; the construction workers
had problems coming to work when violence broke out between the traffickers and
the police; the traffickers would block the streets with burnt cars, large stones and
even trash to impede the police vehicles from entering; the police operations were
unpredictable and violence was indiscriminate. "How," he asked, "could I discuss
citizenship with a father whose son had been killed by the police?" 36 Moreover, all
urbanization projects were negotiated with the traffickers in advance, not directly
by the public authorities, but with community intermediaries so as not to disrupt
construction. He remembered how they would need the traffickers' support to
accomplish almost anything in the community:
For months we had been trying to convince the residents not to throw their trash
out in the open but to deposit it at fixed points in the community for pickup, but
nothing seemed to work, and the trash kept accumulating. One day the traffickers
put up a sign saying that it was forbidden to throw trash anywhere but at the
collection points, and suddenly there was no more trash.?3 7
The traffickers would permit urban upgrading projects, so long as they did not
widen the streets (because this would facilitate police access) or improve public
lighting (for the same reason). With the pacification police it was not that the drug
trade had ended but, "the state has made itself more present". 38
3s Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27,2011
36 Discussion with a UPP recruit in Turano on July 11, 2011
3? Interview with Francisco Mirilli on June 3, 2011
38 Ibid
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Many residents said that the security brought by the pacification police also
has its burdens. While recognizing some police as "friendly, participatory, wanting
to become closer to the residents,"39 many see their impositions as not so different
from those of the traffickers. These tensions are especially evident during the police
searches. The police say that they need to stop and search the residents to prove
that they will not permit the resurgence of the drug trade. The police need to
prevent the return of the traffickers, but the residents feel as though they are under
constant vigilance. They see the searches as discriminatory, stemming from the
mistaken belief that most of the community was once connected to the traffickers.
Some even say that the police searches inhibit their ability to come and go in ways
that are reminiscent of the time when the traffickers controlled the community. At a
community meeting, a father confronted the police over their searches of his son:
Every police search becomes more and more violent They think that our children
are criminals. What has my son done to offend the police? It seems that ifyour face
is poor, or if it's black or if it's dirty then you must be a bandit, but if there are no
more traffickers here then why are we treated like criminals? The treatment of the
police there (referring to the city) must be the same as the police here (the favela).
We are from here, so we have a right to walk around without harassment"40
But what is most striking about these meetings, when the residents confront the
police over complaints about their searches and the captains promise to punish
police abuses, is that these conversations are occurring after years when there was
no recourse against police repression. There are now spaces for confrontation,
opportunities for communication. The residents understand that the pacification
police are intended to be different As an example, the resident's association of Santa
Marta published a pamphlet on citizen rights explaining under what conditions the
police can conduct searches and what information they can demand from the
residents (Visio da Favela Brazil 2010). It reveals the divergence between the types
of treatment that they were accustomed to receiving before from the military police
and what they can expect now from the pacification police. There was even the
39 Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011
40 Resident speaking at a community meeting in Mineira on July 6, 2011
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feeling that, "the pacification police came here to protect us from the police."41 This
is not to dismiss the disagreements over the police searches, especially the constant
criticism of them at every community meeting, even those supposed to be focused
on other things, but only to underline that something is different now that the
residents can openly criticize the police.
In addition to enduring suspicions of the police, deepened by ongoing abuses
of police authority, one of the obstacles in bridging the divide between the residents
and the police is the legacy of the traffickers. Although difficult for me to detect as an
outsider, the residents affirm that the traffickers are still present, or at least they
maintain a symbolic permanence inside the community. Some signs are very stark,
such as the graffiti, delineating which area was dominated by which faction. The red
letters of the Comando Vermelho are painted on walls, including warnings to the
police to stay away. There are even more recent messages threatening the police to
leave because we are returning home. Yet the residents do not need the graffiti to be
reminded that the traffickers still watch over them. As one said about the difference
between the past and the present, "with the arrival of the pacification police the
weapons left, and the weapons were what we feared, but the movement, truthfully,
it continues in a more hidden way."42
Although only the remnants remain, the traffickers influence the community
in subtle yet powerful ways. As a resident recalled, "we lived under the traffickers
for more than twenty years; they had a way of organizing our lives, of regulating
who could enter and leave, of what we could and could not do; this is ingrained in
our heads."43 Their sway over residents is known as the power of suggestion (poder
de sugestdo), where the residents fear talking too much about the traffickers, or
appearing too willing to cooperate with the police, because this would become a
liability if the traffickers return, as many are wary that they will. The traffickers go
to great lengths to retain their sway over the community. A displaced faction was
said to have warned residents not to give food to the police, or let the police use
41 Interview with a resident of Providencia from unpublished material prepared by SEASDH
42 Discussion with residents in Borel on July 16, 2011
43 Discussion with residents in Prazeres on May 31, 2011
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their bathrooms, and two were threatened for breaking this rule. The traffickers
even ordered local businesses to remain closed (which they did), revealing their
enduring power, though their weapons are no longer visible on the streets. The
police tore down some physical reminders of the traffickers, such a wall between
neighboring communities that also separated warring factions as well as the
lookouts where the traffickers would watch for the police. Yet distrust of the police
persists, both because of their past violence and because the residents fear that
their departure will signify the return of the traffickers. Summarizing the tensions
between the past domination of the traffickers and the present police occupation,
one resident said:
It's difficult for us to change our minds from one moment to the next and think the
police are here to help our community. There are many who hate the police because
they witnessed police killings in the past Some people fear the presence of the police
more than the presence, though veiled, of the traffickers.44
Distrust is mutual and self-perpetuating. The residents do not believe that
the police will be permanently stationed in their communities, and they associate
the end of the pacification police with the inevitable return of the traffickers. These
doubts are invariably tied to the failures of past policing experiments. The police are
also suspicious of ongoing ties to the traffickers. The police acknowledge that drugs
are still sold in the community, though they refer to this as the "ant's traffic" because
it is small and only meets internal demand. As one captain said, "There is no illusion
that the traffickers disappeared; there are low-ranking ones in the community, but
they sell in much lower quantities."45 They understand why the residents resist their
searches, but they claim that they are necessary to prevent the resurgence of the
traffickers. It was territorial coexistence between the police and the traffickers that
undermined past community policing programs, thus the police say that firmness is
imperative to convince the residents that this time they will be permanent. As one
captain said, "If I apprehend a trafficker then I win twenty supporters, but if I decide
44 Discussion with residents in Providencia on July 10, 2011
4s Discussion with a resident of Pavso-Pavsozinho/Cantago on July 5, 2011
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to ignore him, because he only has a small amount of drugs, then I lose five."46 The
pacification police struggle to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the residents by
balancing their stance against the traffickers (otherwise they would be seen as
corrupt) without being overly coercive (otherwise this would be reminiscent of
police repression).
Proximity between the Pacification Police and the Children
To enhance their perception in the eyes of the residents the pacification
police focus their attention on the children. As several explained, the adults and the
adolescents already have a negative impression of the police, much of which was
ingrained in them by years of police violence, but the children are more receptive.
Their hope is that because the children are less biased against the police that they
will translate their acceptance to the rest of their family. A teacher told me that
whereas before they were accustomed to giving classes during shootings between
traffickers and the police, now there is tranquility among the students who can
attend school more regularly because they no longer fear random violence. 47 The
pacification police also sponsor activities, such as martial arts, music and dance
classes, and these are often taught by police officers. As a police captain explained
while surrounded by children playing with his hat, "starting with the children is an
opportunity to change their perceptions of the police."4 He organized a soccer
competition for children from several different communities. The Sunday afternoon
event brought together off-duty officers (he attended in civilian clothes with his
wife) as well as residents, with this kind of inter-mingling between the residents
and the police something unimaginable in the past.
It is often the policewomen who are the closest with the children. I saw few
women on patrol; instead most work on outreach with the community. I spoke with
several about their involvement in a drug resistance program in the local schools
where in addition to talking about prevention they also explain the role of the
46 Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 16, 2011
4? Interview with a teacher working in Borel on June 17, 2011
48 Interview with a UPP Captain in Santa Teresa on July 1, 2011
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pacification police. They do not wear their uniforms because they say that this
facilitates their interaction with the children. In the words of one, "we are
attempting to show a different side of the police, a more human side. And when the
children say they do not like the police we try to explain why we are different" 49 She
said there was resistance, especially from those whose family members were killed
by the police or connected to the traffickers, and this she could understand, but she
tried to show, "we are not here to repress but to show another opportunity, another
path."50 For the anniversary of the pacification police, the children painted pictures
of before, with guns in the arms of traffickers and the armored cars of the police
climbing the hill for confrontation, and after, with the pacification police holding
hands with the children and saying hello to people on the street The parents
confirm the benefits of the pacification police for their children. As a mother
explained as she waited outside the police station for her daughter to finish a dance
class, "If they are permanent then the pacification police will benefit the next
generation. The children will have a better reference of the police and they will see
that weapons are not necessary."5 The pacification police are praised by residents
for providing a better reality for the children, who are no longer as tempted by the
violence and the luxury of the traffickers and can admire the police in ways that
were impossible before.
Yet while the pacification police have worked to improve their perception in
the eyes of the children, there remains skepticism even among the youngest. The
police on patrol say that children sometimes throw stones at their cars.52 A captain
recalled saying hello to a boy, but when the child said hello back to him his mother
began hitting him, yelling that he could not talk to the police. In the captains' words,
"His mother was raised to avoid dialogue with the police because before if you
entered a police station you died, either at the hands of the police or in retaliation by
the traffickers. She was hitting him so that he would not talk to us; she was trying to
4 Discussion with a UPP recruits in Turano on July 6, 2011
50 Ibid
51 Discussion with a resident of Prazeres on May 31, 2011
52 Discussion with UPP recruits in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011
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protect him."5 3 A policewoman described her work with the pacification police as
transforming obstacles, questioning mentalities, because if it were not so difficult
then it would not be so rewarding. She knew that it was essential to transform the
negative perceptions, but there were moments of despair, as she remembered how
her unit accompanied a group of children to a performance of Disney on Ice. As they
were boarding the bus the children started singing a song related to the faction that
controlled their community months before. She told me, "I was heartbroken. It was
like the children had been manipulated and they were still scared of the traffickers.
There is the need to break everything and start all over again."54
Tensions between the Pacification Police and the Adolescents
Probably the most contentious part of the pacification police is the
controversy over the bailefunk, or the funk dances that in the time of the traffickers
took place almost every weekend and were the main source of entertainment for the
young residents. Before, the bailes would begin on Friday evenings and last through
Sunday. With the pacification police, they were initially banned. The police said that
this was to ensure that the remnants of the traffickers did not return, but their
firmness soon conflicted with many residents' desire to hold the dances. There is
still no common policy for the bailes; in some communities they are permitted until
a certain hour, in others they require the approval of the captain, and in some they
are forbidden. A young resident defended the dances, "The bailes were not only for
the traffickers, but now they are forbidden because the police say that the music
favors the traffickers. Funk is part of our culture and its prohibition is
discriminatory."55 From the perspective of the police, the bailes recall the time of the
traffickers because it was at these parties that they sold their drugs and the music
praised the power of the kingpins. The pacification police earned the enmity of
many residents both for banning the bailefunk and setting limits on how late they
can now go into the night. According to one captain, "the baile was where the
s3 Discussion with UPP recruits in Turano on July 6,2011
s4 Interview of UPP recruit in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 26, 2011
ss Discussion with residents of Borel on July 17, 2011
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traffickers earned their power, they were financed by the traffickers because this
was where drugs were sold and music was played to glorify the traffickers."56 In
contrast, several residents with whom I spoke saw the bailefunk as cultural
expressions of their community, or at least as unjustly stigmatized by the police. As
one complained:
The shootings ended, but we live under a dictatorship of the police. They prohibit
everything; everything requires their approval. Funk has been vetoed. Young people
always have to submit to vexing searches. Of course it's good to no longer hear
shootings, but to have peace we lost liberty.57
To understand this debate it is first important to provide some background.
Over the past two decades the bailefunk developed into a vibrant and essential part
of the urban youth culture of Rio de Janeiro, especially in thefavelas. It is described
both as an empowering musical practice and an intrinsic element of the traffickers'
control (Sneed 2008, 59-60). Given its sexually explicit dance moves and its lyrical
association with the drug factions, funk has been criticized as a violent (and socially
irresponsible) musical form. Yet attending a baile reveals its undeniable significance
for many young people. Attending a baile means mixing with a density of people
moving in all directions, pulsating to the music, making it difficult to breathe, even
dance, but from personal experience exhilarating. Inverting the social geography of
Rio de Janeiro, almost all songs are written by and about people living in thefavelas,
humanizing daily lives and struggles (Sneed 2008, 70). The traffickers appropriated
the baile when they took control of the community. They sponsored bailes where
drugs were sold in abundance and weapons openly brandished. The association
between the baile funk and the traffickers gave rise to a subgenre known as
proibiddo, whose songs are about the factions and their most notorious gangsters.
The proibiddo are prohibited from the radio and only performed live at the bailes
because they praise the traffickers, glorify their violence and warn the police to stay
away. For these reasons the pacification police banned the bailefunk.
56 Interview of UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 7,2011
s7 Discussion with residents of Borel on July 17, 2011
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While the rules imposed by the pacification police concerning the bailefunk
are different across the communities, the tension is common to all. In one pacified
community surrounded by others still controlled by the traffickers, an officer stated
emphatically, "I have no problem with the music but with the consumption of drugs.
If we hold a baile then people from the surrounding communities will come and this
will only show that we are giving space to the traffickers to return. I will quit if there
is ever a baile in the community."58 In contrast, a captain in a different community
among the first to permit the return of the bailes said, "I do not want to be the mayor
of the community."5 9 Shortly after taking command, he held a meeting where the
residents voted to hold the bailes but only until two in the morning. He thought that
the difference between the time of the traffickers and the time of the pacification
police is that now there could be a consensus. Before it was dangerous to complain
to the traffickers about the loud music. Several officers mentioned that despite
complaints about their regulations over the bailefunk that the residents
complimented them for making the community more livable since the loud music
did not play all night One captain said that he even received more complaints when
he permitted the bailes than when he prohibited them:
Do you want to know the biggest problem that I face today? Loud music! The
residents have the right to play music at parties, but their neighbors have rights too.
Who would have imagined that in a community once dominated by the traffickers
that the biggest problem would be loud music?60
Yet the regulation of the bailefunk is the main point of conflict between the
adolescents of the community and the pacification police. The young residents often
complain that without the bailes there is nothing for them to do in the community.
Comparing the excitement about the pacification police in the media to his more
monotonous reality, one young resident said:
You turn on the television and you see the presenters saying thatyou can visit our
community, thatyou will have no problem now that the traffickers are no longer
58 Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 7, 2011
59 Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in the Southern Zone on July 1, 2011
6 0 Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 12,2011
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here. But why wouldyou come here? To do what? We no longer have anything to
do. I didn't like the weapons and the drugs at the bailefunk, so why don't the police
just permit us to have a baile without criminals?61
The pacification police recognize this tension with the adolescents, not only because
they are sometimes the ones most connected to the traffickers (directly by working
with them or indirectly because the traffickers were their peers) but also because
the police still see them with suspicion. Some left school to work for the traffickers;
others stopped studying because there are no middle or high schools located in their
community.62 Many young residents are known colloquially as nem-nem, for nem
trabalha, nem estuda, or never worked, never studied. This is not to imply that all
were connected to the traffickers but they are certainly the most resistant to the
presence of the pacification police. The police say that the only way to win them
over is with education and employment, but this is insufficient for those who grew
up mesmerized by the traffickers. As a captain explained:
The pacification police cannot transform the reality of the adolescents. They are
sitting on the sidewalk waiting for us to leave. Their best time was with the
traffickers, but their plans - to get rich, to have many women and to die by the age
of twenty - were destroyed with our arrival. They never studied so they have no
opportunities. It's very difficult to change this perspective.63
Everyday Transformations Underway
Without denying the tensions between the pacification police and the young
residents, the very fact that there are community meetings where these grievances
can be voiced marks a significant change from the past. Encounters between the
police and the residents are an occasion to address their divergences on problems
ranging from the police searches and their rules on the bailefunk. While saying that
they understand why many residents are bothered by these impositions, the police
also provide their perspective. During a community meeting, a policeman said that
61 Discussion with residents in Cantagalo/Pavio-Pavsozinho on July 5, 2011
62 There is no middle school in Cidade de Deus, a place of 36,500 people (according to 2010 Census)
63 Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 16, 2011
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the residents had preconceived, prejudiced notions of the police, "the young people
look at us as if we were the worst things in the world."64 In response, a young
resident admitted that many of his friends reviled the police, and only one year of
the pacification police was too short to break old paradigms. The meeting also
included role-play, whereby young residents and police recruits simulated a police
search, but with their roles reversed, so that the residents acted as policemen and
the policemen as residents. A policeman pretended to be a young resident who
refused to show what was in his backpack, and the two imitated an argument
similar to the ones that would often occur on the street. The intention was to show
the residents how it was difficult for the police to do their job without cooperation
from the community. They saw how police frustration could escalate when all they
wanted to see was that there were no drugs or weapons in the bag. When both
pretended to fight over the refusal to open the backpack it made everybody laugh at
the reality of what really happened.
There are moments such as these when the deep-seated doubts between the
police and the residents are temporarily broken, moments that the commander of
the pacification police described as, "recognizing each other's common humanity, a
recognition that had been missing because of the violence that the police inflicted on
the residents and the territorial control exerted by the traffickers."65 The
pacification police attend most community meetings, even those about mundane
topics such as the location of the trash bins in the community, as these are moments
to learn about their most important concerns. The residents often change the topic
to bring up problems with the police. Residents from various communities said that
especially at night, when the captain was not there, that the most truculent
policemen would threaten them. It cannot be denied that the pacification police
never abuse their powers over the residents, or overstep their authority in imposing
police searches and rules about the bailefunk, but there are everyday changes in
how policing is done with the pacification police. In the words of a police captain:
64 Discussion among UPP recruits and young residents in Borel on June 17, 2011
65 Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29,2011
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Before people that wouldn't speak with me now speak, or at least they say good
morning; people that used to say good morning now come inside the station; people
that would come inside the building now talk to me on the street."66
Both the residents and the police said that this transition would take time. Speaking
to a captain during a community meeting, one resident said, "It's difficult for us to
change from one hour to the next to think that the police who were once shooting
their way into the community are now here to help us. There are many who hate the
police, who fear the police, who are wary of the pacification police."67 Responding to
her criticism, because she said that most of her neighbors were too scared to report
abuses since they feared retaliation, the police officer thanked her for coming
forward, "your courage is proof that the pacification police are working."68
In many ways they are working. The pacification police are unlike precedents
of policing the informal settlements. This is not to deny persistent tensions between
the residents and the police, nor ongoing resistance inside the military police, but
the differences with the past are undeniable. Nowhere is this transformation more
apparent than in meetings bringing together residents and the police, opportunities
unimaginable when the traffickers controlled these communities and interactions
with the police were dominated by violence. The residents who make accusations
against the police say that their neighbors are reluctant to come forward with more,
but the fact that some residents are speaking up reveals how things are changing.
66 Interview of a UPP Captain in Central Zone from unpublished material prepared by SEASDH
67 Resident speaking at a community meeting in Cidade de Deus on July 30, 2011
68 UPP officer speaking at community meeting in Cidade de Deus on July 30, 2011
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CHAPTER 4: Untangling Metaphors of War
This chapter tells the story of the pacification police from the perspective of
the police. The side of the police is one that is often not told. They are portrayed as
villains - violent and/or corrupt - without almost any assessment of their motives.
As many past programs of community policing were undermined from within, the
purpose in providing the perspective of the police is to study what is different (or
not) about the pacification police. Much like past attempts at reform where the
initiative came from inside the military police, the primary backers of the
pacification police are those working for them. In addition to telling the story of
those patrolling the streets, it dwells on the possibility that the pacification police
are a step towards reforming the military police. Despite all that makes them
distinct, the pacification police are still trained to be military police; yet this is
something that the pacification police commander is hoping to change. In place of a
police that sees security only through the lens of repression, he wants to reform the
police in the mold of community policing. What is most interesting is that in many
ways the pacification police are being formed into community policemen and
women less by their training and more by their everyday interactions with residents
on the streets of the informal settlements.
The captains say that residents knock on their door less often to report police
abuses and more often to complain about local problems, such as streets littered
with trash because the municipality no longer comes to collect it. The pacification
police have become the informal locus of community concerns as well as formal
interlocutors with public authorities responsible for providing these services. Often
in the peripheral communities, the pacification police are among the few public
authorities physically present and listening. The pacification police were installed to
contain the violence emanating from these spaces and pave the way for a more
complete state presence. Yet their challenge is to make their intensified presence
less violent, less corrupt and more approachable for the population. This means
undoing a history of police violence, both inside the minds of residents who remain
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wary of the police, as well as within the military police, which is torn between path-
dependent mentalities resistant to reform and reform-minded officers who seek to
transform the military police.
Everyday Experiences of the Pacification Police
Relatively little is known about the perceptions of the police themselves. An
internal evaluation is important for several reasons. First, for the pacification police
to be sustainable, they require support from those putting community policing into
practice, especially as discontent among the police will be reflected in their relations
with the residents. Second, for the pacification police to induce police reform, they
need legitimacy in the eyes of the police, as without their acceptance of community
policing it is unlikely that things will change on the ground. If those trained in the
precepts of community policing do not incorporate these ideas into practice then it
will be difficult to translate this philosophy to the rest of the military police. Third,
given their insider knowledge of how the pacification police work in practice, their
suggestions are essential to improve the program. If the police are not integral to
the process of reform, then the pacification police will be undermined from within.
A survey69 of 359 pacification police recruits by the Center for Security and
Citizenship Studies at the University Candido Mendes in Rio de Janeiro sets forth
their perspective. To my understanding it is the only quantitative study that asks the
pacification police what they think. Around 40 percent were satisfied with their job
most of the time. When asked to suggest improvements to the pacification police, 50
percent cited the working conditions. Many recruits live far from the city and there
are no bathrooms or secure places to store their valuables. While complaints about
working conditions are common to most military police, the pacification police
should earn a bonus payment (intended to reduce corruption), but there are reports
it is not paid on time. It is interesting to note that 27 percent of recruits thought that
community relations was the best part of their job, while 27 percent cited it as the
worst part of their job, underlining one of the most persistent tensions surrounding
69 Unidades de Policia Pacificadora: 0 Que Pensam os Policias by the Centro de Estudos de Seguranga e
Cidadania (CESeC) (the survey was carried out between November and December 2010)
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the pacification police...the difficulty of overcoming mutual suspicions between the
residents and the police.
Police Evaluations of Working Conditions
Salary
Uniforms .....
Bathrooms
Dormitonries
Support, food, housing U Good
Punctuality of bonus payment Normal
Distance between community and home U Terrible
Distance between community and batallion
Conditions of their base in community
Relations with military police
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Best Aspects of Work With
Pacification Police
Community 1er
policing
7% Colleagues/
captain
Nothing 7%
positive
7%
Worst Aspects of Work With
Pacification Police
Not police
wok
5%
Colleagues/
captain
2%
Nothing 2
gatne3% v
Regarding training, a surprisingly high 63 percent said that they received adequate
training to work in the pacification police (this is surprising because the officers said
that training in community policing was the most lacking). Of their training, they
recalled courses in ethics, community policing, cautious use of force, techniques to
search suspects, human rights, personal defense, public relations and shooting.
Their most cited responsibilities were conflict mediation, domestic violence
reduction and authorization of leisure activities, hinting at the contentious nature of
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the bailefunk. Though few thought resolving infrastructure problems was their role,
most said that collaborating with public agencies, identifying community problems,
developing sport and educational activities and providing social assistance was
what they should be doing. Yet only 5 percent said that they attend community
meetings with frequency, pointing to possible disconnects in the precepts of
community policing and the actuality of policing the informal settlements.
What Are Police Responsibilities
Help resolve infrastructure problems
Organize parties and events
Provide assistance to community
Develop sport and educational activities
Identify community problems
Collaborate with public authorities
Prohibit and authorize leisure activities
Domestic violence reduction
Conflict mediation
0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0%
Most Frequent Police Activities
Meetings with residents o
Activities with children and elderly
Receiving visitors and tourists
Surveying problems
Meetings with superiors
Registering incidences with civil police
Receiving complaints
Searching suspects 4______
0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0%
The majority of respondents (94 percent) thought that they needed to carry a gun.
Most said this was for protection against the traffickers, though some acknowledged
that it was to intimidate the residents. When asked what they most feared about
their job, 55 percent said an encounter with a trafficker. When asked how the
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Police Perception of Community residents thought of them, they
Perceptions of the Police admitted the distrust but said
100.0% that things were changing; only 4
percent thought that the
80.0%
residents were initially positive
about the police, but this rose to
60.0%
0 Negative 24 percent when asked about
40.0% Neutral now, though the majority stillM Positive
thought that the residents
20.0% disliked them. They said that the
children and elderly were the
0.0% most receptive while the
Before Now adolescents were the most
hostile. Given the everyday difficulties of the informal settlements, including difficult
physical access, dearth of infrastructure and distrust by residents, 70 percent of the
pacification police recruits said that they would prefer to work directly with the
military police.
The survey results contrast the very positive external evaluation of the
pacification police with the internal complaints about what is lacking. They are
portrayed in the media as innovative, of bringing change not only to the informal
settlements but also within the police, but the recruits say that they feel much less
involved. On one level, they appear to understand the ideas of community policing,
at least as articulated by many of the most important activities that the pacification
police are meant to undertake; yet on another level, it is not only that they do not
implement these activities in practice, as their most frequent activity is searching
suspects, but also that they believe that they are still distrusted by the residents.
While their concerns with working conditions may appear individualistic and
confined, if not addressed they could undermine the broader initiatives that the
pacification police intend to accomplish. If the precepts of community policing can
convince the pacification police then they will more likely permeate the rest of the
military police.
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Although the recruits that I spoke with were positive about the pacification
police, their experiences are not without some difficulties. I spoke with several who
lived in communities still controlled by the traffickers. They told me about having to
remove their uniforms before returning home to keep their profession secret from
their neighbors. Just as residents are wary of the police, the police are frightened of
working in communities where they are vulnerable to attacks by the traffickers. One
told me how he was scared to walk around the community unarmed, as the captain
had prohibited the police from carrying guns during the daytime hours:
Everybody is concerned with the security of the residents, but who is concerned with
our security? I don't live in the community but in another part of the city still
controlled by the traffickers. What would happen to my family if they found out that
I was a policeman??0
Others who come from the interior of the state told me how they travel several
hours to work, where they face trying conditions because of the routine difficulties
of working in the informal settlements as well as the hasty preparation of the
pacification police. One year after the inauguration of some units, several do not
have an actual building to work out of; instead the pacification police operate out of
mobile offices that resemble large metal containers. These are uncomfortable,
especially in the intense heat of the summer, and undermine their legitimacy in the
eyes of the community, as the police feel that these impermanent structures signal
that the pacification police will only be there temporarily. There are sometimes no
bathrooms designated for police use, which puts them in an awkward position when
they have to ask the residents to use their facilities. Those with designated police
structures say that having an actual building greatly facilitates their work because it
demonstrates to the community that this time their presence will be permanent.
The pacification police in one community restored a six-story building on the main
street to serve as their station. In another, they appropriated a building used by the
traffickers as their base. Graffiti still marks the territories of the traffickers, but the
70 Discussion with a policeman in Tabajaras/Cabritos on June 3, 2011
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pacification police want to demonstrate their physical and symbolic presence in
these communities.
From Pacifying the Informal Settlements to Pacifying the Military Police
The many different demands placed on the pacification police broaden the
mandate of the police in the informal settlements. According to the first pacification
police commander, "there is conflict over the training of the military police, disputes
over what it means to be a policeman." 71 The dissonance between their militarized
training and their daily routine of patrolling the community is symbolized by what
he terms the "warrior ethos". He hopes that the pacification police will become part
of a process of "permanent education" to inculcate a new mentality in the military
police; yet their inclination towards violence is rooted in their militarized training:
The training of the military police is the formation of a warrior ethos...much like
how violence held a symbolic value for the traffickers, with the police as their
enemy, the military police are trained not to recognize the humanity of the
residents, who they see as their enemy.72
In order to help me understand the dehumanization process inherent to their
training, he evoked the movie Tropa de Elite about the elite squad of the military
police. In fact, numerous policemen mentioned the movie because in telling their
story it both generated sympathy for the military police and sensationalized their
violence. Specifically, he retold the story of Matias, a recruit to the military police
who devoted himself to undoing police corruption and attending law school. He is
portrayed differently than the majority of the military police, both intellectually
cognizant of its failures and determined to improve the military police from within.
This is until he is initiated into the elite squad, where he is trained in the mentality
of war, and when he was transformed into a soldier. In the final scene, Matias beats
one of the traffickers to the ground, puts his rifle in his bloodied face and shoots him
71 Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29,2011
72 Ibid
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without mercy. According to the pacification police commander, the movie explains
how the police are trained to be warriors inside the informal settlements. In his own
words, "our identity is very similar to the armed forces; we are trained not to
identify with our opponents; a soldier cannot do this in battle and the police are
trained in the same way."73
The pacification police are a step towards undermining the warrior ethos.
After six months of training in the military police academy, all those destined to
serve in the pacification police (an estimated 90 percent of the recruits) receive a
two-week course on community policing. The commander of the pacification police
says that this is more symbolic than practical because he spends more time undoing
the militaristic training they learned in the military police than training them in the
day-to-day rituals of community policing.74 But this is a process of transition
according to an official in the State Secretary of Public Security.7s She is currently
teaching a more integrated human rights program in the military police academy. In
addition, she created an education committee of officials from five state security
forces to review their curricula in a formal setting. One problem from before was
that the instructors at the military police academy (all military policemen and
women) were working for free, making it difficult to coordinate their training,
especially when they taught conflicting ideas. The reforms require that instructors
are selected and paid in a more transparent matter and that they adjust their
teaching to the community-policing curriculum. The objective is that the pacification
police will no longer have separate training in community policing because all of the
military police recruits will be trained according to these principles.
The pacification police told me that there is intense skepticism of community
policing within the military police. According to one captain:
I have no support from the institution. We are lacking so many things here, and
everything that I achieve I have to do on my own because the pacification police
73 Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29,2011
74 Ibid
7s From an interview of Juliana Barroso by Stephanie Gimenez Stahlberg, as published in the working
paper The Pacification of Favelas in Rio dejaneiro
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aren't supported inside the institution. It is supportedfrom the outside, among the
population of the city, but not inside the police itself 7 6
To counter this suspicion inside the military police, the pacification police point to
criminal indices in the informal settlements where they are working, underlining
the dramatic declines in violence compared to when the military police, with their
repressive methods, operated in these areas. They recognize their divergences with
the military police, and understand the danger of creating two distinct forces, one
for the pacified informal settlements and another for the rest of the city, but the
pacification police officers are optimistic as to whose strategy will prevail:
I don't see any possibility that the pacification police would not continue. After all
the work that has been done to remove the traffickers from the favelas, it would be
impossible for any politician to abandon them and return them to the traffickers
once again. They could change the name, but I believe that the only way to keep the
traffickers away is by permanent policing.77
Moreover, the possibilities of promotion mean that most pacification police officers
will eventually return to the military police. As one told me about this transition:
Things were more difficult last year, but everyday is better than yesterday. We need
to conquer each resident, each child, each adult We also need to conquer the police
with this attitude. This is an ideological re-conquest Every day is a re-conquest of
territory, but not necessarily physical territory. It is an ideological re-conquest of
both the residents and the police.78
It is hoped that by training in the precepts of community policing, starting with the
pacification police and expanding outwards to the rest of the military police, will
deconstruct the warrior ethos that has long characterized the military police.
Mediating Between States and Citizens
It is outside the military police academy and on the streets of the informal
settlements where the pacification police are receiving their best training in
76 Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in Santa Teresa on July 1, 2011
77 Discussion with UPP recruits in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on July 1, 2011
78 Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Southern Zone conducted on July 1, 2011
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community policing. In their everyday interactions with residents, mediating their
ongoing needs with the responsibilities of the public authorities, the pacification
police are reforming the police by becoming service providers to the community.
The arrival of the pacification police has brought some improvements in the
provision of much needed, but still deficient, infrastructure and social services. The
traffickers no longer monopolize the distribution of cooking gas so its price has gone
down. The police have regulated the ubiquitous moto-taxis that transport residents
from the top to the bottom of the hill in the absence of public transportation. The
electricity company was one of the first to enter the communities to formalize the
once pirated connections. Although there is controversy over the cost burden on
those whose electricity consumption is now metered and billed, many residents say
that they appreciate having higher quality services because "we want someone who
we can appeal to."79 The company has a social tariff to give residents a discount on
their electricity bill, and they have hired a vast array of community interlocutors to
educate residents on reducing their electricity consumption to manage their bills.
The security provided by the pacification police also means the end of the gato-net,
or illegal television cable hookups, and there is significant competition among cable
television providers to enroll new customers with social tariffs. There are efforts by
the public garbage collection company to attend to the challenging geographies of
the informal settlements, including building motorcycles that can carry trash on a
cart attached to the back (because these can access the steep and narrow roads
which trucks cannot reach). These anecdotes are not to give the misimpression that
infrastructure projects are ongoing in all of the informal settlements, and meetings
bringing together service providers with residents are infused with the tensions of
enduring unattended to demands, but they reveal that the pacification police are
also seen as an opportunity to enhance service provision and undertake
infrastructure projects that were more difficult in the time of the traffickers.
While they want to be receptive to these demands, the pacification police feel
that it is beyond their capacity to meet most of them. These demands test the limits
79 Discussion with residents in Cidade de Deus on January 12, 2012
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of the mandate of the police, but as they are the first to arrive in the community they
are charged with articulating its needs and coordinating with service providers. It is
difficult to generalize the extent of these demands across different communities, but
the police are well aware of what is lacking. The captains designate their most
communicative recruits as proximity police, who are charged with circulating inside
the community, learning the residents' main concerns and attempting to bring these
needs to the attention of the relevant government agencies or service providers. In
certain communities they even walk around without uniforms to foster
approachability with the residents. The residents point out that the proximity police
have provided important support, such as taking a pregnant woman to the hospital
in one of the police cars because her house was not on a road that an ambulance
could reach. One proximity policemen told me that many residents did not know
about the Bolsa Familia conditional cash-transfer program that entitled families
making less than minimum wage to financial support as long as they send their
children to school and bring them to a doctor to receive their vaccinations. He was
disturbed by the case of several children walking around the community alone while
their mother passed out pamphlets to support her family. He learned that she could
not send her children to the public school because she did not have their birth
certificates, nor the money to buy their uniforms. While he could have ignored them
as they were not his responsibility, or passed the children to a welfare agency
without a second thought that they would be taken from their mother, instead he is
making repeated efforts to resolve the situation because he understands that this is
why the pacification police are there.80
The pacification police are mediators between the unmet demands and the
practical difficulties of serving these geographically complex and impoverished
communities, but they feel that many demands made on them are far beyond their
training or even their capacity as police. Their impression is that they were thrown
into the informal settlements with barely any support
80 Discussion with a UPP recruit in Tabajaras/Cabritos on June 3, 2011
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The police cannot fix all the problems overnight The aims of the pacification police
are to take away the weapons and to reconquer the credibility of the police, but our
isolated presence here will not resolve anything. We are only here to provide
security so that other services can take place.81
Despite their attempts to be responsive to the demands of the community, the
pacification police are dependent on the support of urban upgrading projects and
social services that only other public authorities can provide. The police provide the
security to make this happen, and the publicity surrounding the pacification police
puts more pressure on the state to act; but ultimately the police are dependent on
myriad other interventions to reduce the divides that have long disconnected the
informal settlements from the rest of the city. They can be receptacles of community
demands but if these needs are not addressed then the pacification police will
inevitably loose legitimacy in the eyes of the residents, regardless of the reforms
taking place inside the military police. The police provide a measure of security,
with many residents seeing the presence of the pacification police as encompassing
a broader notion of security, one needed to address the roots of their poverty, or as
one captain said, "public security includes everybody, not just the police."82
The security provided by the pacification police is essential in bringing other
services that aim to address the underlying insecurities of the informal settlements,
from their lack of tenure to their inadequate infrastructure to their persistent
poverty. But the impact of the pacification police goes far beyond security. The
pacification police have become the frontline service providers in many
communities where the public authorities have long been absent The residents
come to them when they want to report a power line that is in danger of falling over,
or when they notice that there is no trash collection, or when there is a pothole on
the road that needs to be fixed so that the trucks of the electricity company and the
garbage company can come up the hill to address these problems. There are
difficulties in putting these responsibilities on the police, especially when this
demands much more than their training provided them, but community policing is
81 Discussion with a UPP recruit in Turano on July 11, 2011
82 Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in the Southern Zone on July 1, 2011
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about connecting the police to the community, and by being present in these
communities and connecting their concerns with the electricity company, the
garbage company, or the municipal public works agency, the pacification police are
more than mediating concerns between the urban informal poor and the public
authorities but connecting the informal settlements to state.
The security provided by the pacification police means that the state is more
present in ways that it rarely was before when the traffickers controlled the
informal settlements. This is true not only of the police as the state on the streets
but also of the residents who can come and go from their community without fear of
violence breaking out between the traffickers and the police, the utilities who can
now widen roads, connect public lighting and make other investments that the
traffickers would prevent because it made the community less protected against the
police, not to mention the myriad other public and private authorities who no longer
have the excuse of insecurity for not servicing these communities. In my interviews
with the pacification police I found them very interested, desperate even, for news
of when these investments would happen. The police have become receptacles for
the communities' most important needs, from whose house was in danger of falling
down in the next rainfall to when the government was finally going to fulfill its
promise to reconstruct the kindergarten that collapsed during the last rainy season,
from where the residents could deposit their garbage for collection to who qualified
for the social tariff for electricity, from what light post needed repair to when the
massive pothole in the main road was going to be filled...the demands upon the state
are many, and most of these find their way to the pacification police as the most
present (or at least the most visible) public authority in the community.
As revealed in Rio de Janeiro and confirmed in countless cities around the
world, it is difficult to separate urban development programs from public security
policies because insecurity directly impacts service provision and urban upgrading
indirectly impacts experiences of security. It is often thought that security means
sending in the police. This mano dura approach to public security has been criticized
when the police inflict their own violence, often deepening experiences of
insecurity, but what is a government to do? Reestablishing security in situations of
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conflict almost always necessitates some demonstration of force by the coercive arm
of the state. It is difficult to argue that only urban upgrading would displace armed
criminals. There are two contrasting (often opposing) policies in integrating urban
development with reductions in urban violence: traditional heavy-handed security
such as the police and untraditional alternatives such as urban infrastructure or
service provision. The pacification police are an example of how this dichotomy can
be reconciled. They pave the way for service providers in the informal settlements,
both by enhancing security and making these communities more visible and their
infrastructure deficits more pressing for the city authorities. For cities such as Rio
de Janeiro where it is difficult to disentangle where public security ends and urban
development begins there are lessons to be learned from the pacification police.
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Chapter 5: Transforming Urban Governance
The prospects for the pacification police cannot be foretold only through the
anecdotes of the residents and the police. Their insiders' perspectives are important,
but they cannot predict whether the pacification police will be sustainable past the
World Cup and the Olympics, whether they will induce reform in the military police,
whether they will integrate the informal settlements into the urban fabric, whether
they will be an inflection point, or merely a blip, in the intermittent history of police
reform and state intervention in these informal, impoverished and unprotected
spaces. The pacification police were only recently implemented, and their presence
in the informal settlements is ongoing, thus the only conclusions that can be made
stem from their possibilities, and as narrated in the previous chapters on the
residents' changing views of the police and the police's changing views of their own
role in the informal settlements, there are myriad and divergent opportunities.
The perceptions and possibilities of the pacification police are produced by
their context This context is twofold. On the one hand, it includes the urbanization
of poverty and violence in the informal settlements; on the other hand, it includes
the ongoing reality of police violence and the incomplete attempts at police reform.
Whereas Chapter One overviewed the history of the informal settlements, Chapter
Two summarized the more recent past of public security an police reform. The
pacification police are an intersection of these two histories - they are both an
attempt to bring these unprotected spaces back under the control of the state and an
effort to break down the barriers that have long distanced these areas from the rest
of the city, namely the violence of the traffickers as well as the brutality of the police.
The pacification police are the state on the streets in the informal settlements, but as
they come from the same institution that was once the main actor of violence in
these communities, there are significant doubts as to whether they are capable of
returning security. Although they face myriad obstacles if they are to achieve this
objective, Chapter Three points to changing perceptions of the police in the eyes of
residents, and Chapter Four emphasizes possibilities that the pacification police are
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reforming the military police from within. Reforming the military police is
important in connecting the police to the residents of the informal settlements,
connecting once unprotected spaces with the rest of the city and connecting the
state to its citizens. This last chapter uncovers how the pacification police are having
impacts beyond security, because bringing the police to the informal settlements is
beginning to address broader experiences of urban governance.
The New Donos do Morro?
There are myriad factors that have set the informal settlements apart from
the rest of the Rio de Janeiro. From their dearth of urban services to their illegal land
tenure to their precarious locations on hillsides, they are distinct from the rest of the
city despite their physical proximity within it. While their differences are most
visible in terms of infrastructure, they are also underlined politically by their control
by donos do morro, who arose when the favelas were first formed in the early 20"'
century to provide order and to protect the community from forced removal. The
traffickers displaced the donos as those who imposed social order, and in exchange
lent services in times of suffering, though the residents were compelled by violence
to abide by their impositions. The territorial demarcation of power has persisted
throughout the history of thefavelas, with their domination by donos or traficantes
yet another distinction separating them from the city. The persistence of territorial
control underlines one of the many challenges of the pacification police - not only
ensuring their permanence, or even extending infrastructure to these unprotected
spaces, but also deterritorializing them, integrating them, raising their physical
realities to the standard of the formal city, while also dissolving the divisive
territories that define them, including the so-called territories of the pacification
police (Misse 2011).
Although their operations are announced in advance, allowing the traffickers
to flee but ensuring that most take place without a shot being fired, the strategy of
the pacification police is one of territorial occupation, saturating the site with police,
searching the residents, establishing rules. Past community policing experiences
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were tainted by corruption, thus the control over territory is essential to displace
the armed power of the traffickers as well as to deconstruct their symbolic sway
over the community. Yet the distinction between security and occupation is blurred
when armed police patrols replace those of the traffickers, when they monitor and
search who come and go from the community and when they enact rules over the
social lives of the residents. The pacification police cannot become yet another
occupation by yet other strongmen because more is needed to transform these
impoverished communities into neighborhoods integrated with the rest of the city.
These warnings are not intended to deny that the pacification police have not
undone the myriad restraints imposed by the traffickers. The residents can come
and go without fear of violence, but this freedom is somewhat constrained for those
subject to police searches. They can complain to the police about loud music from
the baile funk, but because the police often decide on the regulations without the
consensus of the community they tend to overstep the limits of police authority. The
difficulty with their control over territory is that the pacification police border on
controlling the everyday lives of the residents, or as one resident said, "it must be a
dictatorship if everything has to be approved by the police."8 3 For residents used to
living under the impositions of the traffickers, several said that they were wary of
the police because they no longer knew who was in control. As a community leader
argued not against the pacification police but in favor of more dialogue between
them and the residents:
The pacification police need to understand that what we lived through for many
years is completely different from now. They need to invest more in information,
they need to explain their motives for restricting the parties, for walking around the
community with heavy weaponry, or else it will become like a dictatorship where
they say what needs to be done and that is all.84
The residents fear both the police because of their repression as well the return of
the traffickers, as so many programs similar to the pacification police stumbled in
the past. These fears point to an underlying suspicion that the pacification police are
83 Community meeting in Cidade de Deus on July 29, 2011
84 Discussion with a resident of Cantagalo-Pavio/Pavsozinho on July 5, 2011
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only for the World Cup and the Olympics, and that after the world's gaze is no longer
on Rio de Janeiro, they will fade away as so many police reform programs have in
the past Yet there is still a sense of hope that the pacification police will be more
enduring, especially as their end is inevitably tied to the return of the traffickers. As
one resident asked with incredulity, "I think they will stay because they wouldn't do
that to us, would they? Imagine what would happen if they left? What would happen
to us?"85 It is as though one type of occupation or another is inescapable; the only
source of stability, the only understanding of order, depends on the presence of
armed traffickers or the coercive arm of the state. The pacification police are seen in
terms of integrating the informal settlements with the city, but even the residents
think of the city as something distinct from their community. Even in the most
physically proximate communities, where the main road into thefavela leads to
some the most expensive real estate in Rio de Janeiro, there is a distinction made
between the city (a cidade) and the community (a comunidade). This disconnection
is deepened by the symbols of the traffickers, from the graffiti marking their control
to their ongoing influence over the residents, so that they feel as though they are
always being watched. With their occupation of the informal settlements, there is
the danger of the pacification police becoming the new donos do morro, replacing
the traffickers as the ones who establish the rules and provide internal security.86
Decision-making authority is now vested in the hands of the pacification police. The
captain is sought after not only to resolve problems with the police but also to
mediate access to government institutions and service providers. Turning to the
pacification police is beneficial in terms of enhancing their legitimacy in the eyes of
the community, but it reinforces the perception that the coercive power of the police
is the only source of authority outside of the territorial control by the traffickers.
85 Discussion with three residents of Prazeres on May 31, 2011
86 Interview with Silvia Ramos, co-coordinator of the Center for Studies on Security and Citizenship,
on July 11, 2011
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Nuts and Bolts of Urban Governance Transformation
Looking back over the history of police violence in the informal settlements
as well as the persistence of militarism inside the military police, it is important to
be cautious about the pacification police, but I will conclude my thesis on a hopeful
note. The intended impact of the pacification police is to increase security in the
informal settlements where they are operating. What are more interesting are their
unintended consequences. The pacification police are reconstructing the identity of
the military police, not only in the eyes of residents but also in the minds of police.
Their conclusion is far from uncertain, especially as so many precedents of police
reform failed to gain political traction, much less support from inside the military
police. Yet there is much that makes the pacification police different.
The pacification police are the most widely publicized, broadly implemented
public security reform in recent history in Rio de Janeiro. There are currently about
4,000 recruits working in the pacification police, or 10 percent of the total military
police corporation. The military police academy is rushing to train more recruits
ahead of the World Cup and the Olympics when Rio de Janeiro will be on display for
the entire world. There are estimates that the pacification police could total 60,000
in a few years (Barnes 2011). With these numbers there will be more pacification
police than conventional military police. This is a significant step forward compared
to past programs of police reform that only involved a handful of officers and rarely
went beyond more than a few informal settlements. Moreover, their publicity means
that rather than focusing only on the informal settlements, the entire city is talking
about the pacification police. My anecdotal encounters reveal that much skepticism
remains as to whether the pacification police will still be around after the upcoming
mega-events. It is impossible to make these kinds of predictions, but it is possible to
underline the achievements that the pacification police have already made.
My main argument is that the pacification police are possibly transforming
the understanding and experience of urban governance in Rio de Janeiro. At least
they have the potential to fulfill this unintended mission with support from public
authorities. They are doing so directly by undoing the metaphors of war that once
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mediated relations between the military police and the residents of the informal
settlements. They are also doing so indirectly as the state on the streets where they
are operating. The pacification police are symbolically transforming how the state
interacts with the urban poor by physically reconnecting the informal settlements
with the city, enhancing public accountability to serving these communities and
broadening the state's legitimacy in these once unprotected spaces.
The pacification police are making the state more physically present in the
informal settlements. My attendance at community meetings and my discussions
with residents reveal that what they want is not a police occupation but a social
invasion. When I asked a community leader what her community needed that the
pacification police could not provide, she replied, "Everything; basic infrastructure
to live. We want maintenance by the public authorities. The police are about force
and enforcement. The social aspect is not part of their culture."87 The residents are
hopeful that with the pacification police that more investment in infrastructure and
social services will be extended to their communities. Urbanizing and upgrading the
informal settlements has been a struggle from long before the pacification police,
something that goes far beyond the mandate of the police. There are several service
providers that are collaborating with the pacification police to enter the informal
settlements (and enroll new customers). Others are more intransigent, but they are
facing increasing demands from the residents who remind them that they no longer
have the excuse of insecurity for not serving their communities.
The pacification police are also making the state more accountable. There is
still police repression, even several autos de resistencia, or police killings supposedly
for resisting arrest It cannot be argued that the pacification police have broken with
their militarized training but they are part of a transition in how policing is done in
the informal settlements. The very fact that residents can confront the captain with
stories of police abuse is already an achievement compared to the very recent past
when there was almost no recourse against police violence. Two pacification police
captains have already been removed for corruption with the traffickers, underlining
87 Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27,2011
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the temptations of collusion but emphasizing the efforts that the pacification police
are making to punish corruption when before it was mostly overlooked. Enhancing
accountability also means making the state more responsive to its citizens. The very
presence of the pacification police puts pressure on all levels of the state - from
politicians to public service providers - to pay more attention to spaces that once
were thought about mainly in terms of insecurity, especially as the city wants to
show that much is being done in anticipation of the World Cup and the Olympics.
The shadow of the upcoming mega-events holds sway over the pacification
police. Their full rollout across the most visible parts of the city - where the tourists
flock, where the private sector flourishes, where the athletes and their fans will
congregate in a few years time - is timed to coincide with the World Cup, when the
final game will be played in the famous Maracans Stadium in Rio de Janeiro in 2014.
In a country that takes its futebol very seriously the importance of this moment
cannot be overstated. Their connection to the mega-events is often a criticism of the
pacification police, but I wonder if this could also be an opportune time to make
more lasting changes to public security specifically and to urban governance more
broadly. With its economic resurgence and its prominent role on the diplomatic
stage there is much attention focused on Brazil's postcard city. The private sector is
migrating from the metropolis of Sio Paulo to the beauty of Rio de Janeiro
(Economist 2011). The pacification police are part of a program to position Rio de
Janeiro, long tarnished by its reputation for violence, as a city for local, national and
international investment Brazil's richest businessman is contributing R$20 million
annually to support the pacification police. The pacification police are making Rio de
Janeiro a safer city for capital, but are there possibilities that the urban informal
poor could benefit from these opportunities?
To accomplish its official objective of pacifying the informal settlements, one
of the unofficial outcomes of the pacification police is the beginning of a pacification
of the military police. A city safe for capital is not one where armed criminals control
almost all of the more than one thousand informal settlements where about one-
fourth of the population resides. Nor is a safe city one where statistics of police
violence are among the highest in the world. Almost inadvertently in attempting to
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make the city safer for capital the pacification police are simultaneously fostering
different possibilities of urban governance for the urban poor. A transformation in
urban governance means enhancing the legitimacy of the state in the informal
settlements where its presence has long been distant, if not deeply complicit in the
violence within them. More than revealing only its coercive presence with the
armed invasions of the military police or the intermittent efforts at urban
upgrading, the pacification police are strengthening the infrastructural power of the
state. The transition from militarized to community policing is also part of a broader
transformation from a state that was once distant in terms of infrastructure and
complicit in terms of violence but is moving towards more direct engagement with
the urban informal poor who have been only indirectly, if not outside, the realm of
its governance. The pacification police are making this happen by connecting the
state to the informal settlements.
Conclusion
Where once democratization confronted many developing countries, much of
the current discourse debates the institutional character of developmental states.
Despite the consolidation of political democracy, there remain questions as to the
responsiveness of democracies to the economic and social rights of its citizens. The
developing state has been transformed, but in the language of development, has the
state "become closer to the people?" (Heller 2001, 132) Brazil is often portrayed as a
laboratory of democratic reform and inclusive governance, where civil society
pressured an authoritarian regime into democratizing, where a city government
began an experiment in participatory budgeting that was translated to the national
and international scales, where a national government consolidated social programs
that contributed to one of the sharpest declines in poverty in a history of having the
world's highest levels of inequality (H outzager 2010; Santos 1998; Ferreira 2010).
Yet there are questions as to broader understandings and experiences of democratic
governance.
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This is especially true in the informal settlements, where ambiguous tenure
begets artisanal construction, where inadequate infrastructure necessitates
informal provision, where informality intersects with insecurity which stems from
the inability and/or unwillingness of the state to confront the reality of its urban
informal poor. Thefavelas of Rio de Janeiro are the subject of fascination and scorn;
they are from where much of the city's allure originates yet where most of its fears
are concentrated (Baiocchi 2001, 143). Yet the urbanization of poverty is more than
the production of informality but the transformation of urban governance.
Notwithstanding their poverty, nor overlooking their insecurity, thefavelas of Rio de
Janeiro are where urban governance is evolving, where the longstanding absence of
the state once termed them ungoverned spaces, but where urban governance with
the pacification police is transforming.
The pacification police are a step towards transforming urban governance
across Rio de Janeiro. This is most obvious in the realm of security but their impact
reverberates beyond reductions in violence in and around the informal settlements.
The pacification police are a step towards fostering inclusion in a city long divided,
with the police as intermediaries between a state that has long been distant and the
urban poor who have long been excluded. Cynicism says that the pacification police
will not last beyond the Olympics, but with the eyes of the world on Rio de Janeiro it
is hopeful that a temporary security fix will translate into a permanent governance
approach. The pacification police are already transforming the ways that the urban
poor experience the police, and with the police the most visible presence of the state
on the streets, they are potentially transforming how the residents of the informal
settlements interact with the state. These impacts are both narrow and profound,
limited in the sense that only a few of the more than one thousandfavelas across the
metropolitan area will benefit from the pacification police, but extensive in the
sense that this example provides insight into a way forward in the inclusion of the
urban poor in the urbanization of their communities and the integration of the
informal settlements into the urban fabric of the city.
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